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In today’s society of humans and machines, 
automation, animation, and ecosystems 
are terms of concern. Categories of life 
and technology have become mixed in 
governmental policies and drive economic 
exploitation and the pathologies of everyday 
life. This book both curiously and critically 
advances the term that underlies these new 
developments: machine.
‘The machine’ proves that whoever said that the rise of data 
was going to cause the end of theory could not be more wrong. 
The new forms of digital automation of society, the question 
of the relationship with the animated machine, and the new 
cybernetics of ecosystemic governance provide rich instigation 
to philosophy, proving that machines can and do make us think 
new thoughts.” — Tiziana Terranova, Naples Eastern University
“A significant contribution to the understanding and politics of 
the becoming of machines and techno-systems in the twenty-
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Series Foreword
“Media determine our situation,” Friedrich Kittler infamously wrote 
in his Introduction to Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Although this 
dictum is certainly extreme— and media archaeology has been 
critiqued for being overly dramatic and focused on technological 
developments— it propels us to keep thinking about media as 
setting the terms for which we live, socialize, communicate, orga-
nize, do scholarship, et cetera. After all, as Kittler continued in his 
opening statement almost thirty years ago, our situation, “in spite 
or because” of media, “deserves a description.” What, then, are the 
terms— the limits, the conditions, the periods, the relations, the 
phrases— of media? And, what is the relationship between these 
terms and determination? This book series, In Search of Media, 
answers these questions by investigating the often elliptical “terms 
of media” under which users operate. That is, rather than produce 
a series of explanatory keyword- based texts to describe media 
practices, the goal is to understand the conditions (the “terms”) 
under which media is produced, as well as the ways in which media 
impacts and changes these terms.
Clearly, the rise of search engines has fostered the proliferation 
and predominance of keywords and terms. At the same time, it 
has changed the very nature of keywords, since now any word 
and pattern can become “key.” Even further, it has transformed 
the very process of learning, since search presumes that, (a) with 
the right phrase, any question can be answered and (b) that the 
answers lie within the database. The truth, in other words, is “in 
viii there.” The impact of search/media on knowledge, however, goes 
beyond search engines. Increasingly, disciplines— from sociology to 
economics, from the arts to literature— are in search of media as 
a way to revitalize their methods and objects of study. Our current 
media situation therefore seems to imply a new term, understood 
as temporal shifts of mediatic conditioning. Most broadly, then, this 
series asks: What are the terms or conditions of knowledge itself?
To answer this question, each book features interventions by 
two (or more) authors, whose approach to a term— to begin with: 
communication, pattern discrimination, markets, remain, machine— 
diverge and converge in surprising ways. By pairing up scholars 
from North America and Europe, this series also advances media 
theory by obviating the proverbial “ten year gap” that exists across 
language barriers due to the vagaries of translation and local 
academic customs. The series aims to provoke new descriptions, 
prescriptions, and hypotheses— to rethink and reimagine what 
media can and must do. 
Introduction
Un/Civil Engineering
Thomas Pringle
In Ted Chiang’s (2002) sci- fi short story “Seventy- Two Letters,” the 
young protagonist uses epithetical codes to program the behavior 
of golem- like autonomous robots against the backdrop of a specu-
lative nineteenth- century England. Upon discovering an epithet 
that allows the construction of automata capable of building other 
simple automata, the Industrial Revolution– esque society is thrown 
into a crisis. While the character’s discovery is intended to release 
proletariat laborers from horrid factory conditions through the 
automated production of inexpensive machine engines that could 
potentially regrow the cottage industries lost to manufactories, the 
prospect of true self- reproducing machines unintentionally draws 
the ire of a powerful union of sculptors tasked with handcrafting 
the automata. The threat of reproductive machines is a contradic-
tion, insofar as the laborers carefully sculpting the automata— with 
prestige and by hand— reject a technological development that 
promises to reinstate their own preferred labor conditions to the 
oppressed and demeaned textile workers. Referencing the Goethe 
poem “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice” in support of their cause, the 
unionists recount the cautionary tale of the self- generating anthro-
pomorphic brooms whose simple machinic function to fill buckets 
of water and clean the floor turns into an out- of- control mess.
The story’s protagonist rejects the warning that automata could 
self- reproduce without human assistance as an outdated objection 
and insists that there remains a radical political potential for new 
x democratic machines working alongside laboring people. Goethe’s 
account of automated destruction and an assistant pleading the 
sorcerer to rescue a situation run amok is a widely applied cliché, 
but Chiang’s political setting offers insight for how the perception 
of machines as objects of work, beauty, knowledge, and play 
remains a societal problem. The machine could be a savior to 
some and a curse for others, and, either way, its mass manufacture 
promises to recast the social fabric at large. Today, the question 
is less about the dangers of total mechanization— the nightmare 
prediction of science fiction and antihumanism— or the operation 
of systems without adequate knowledge or experience, as access 
to technology is diffractively policed according to the persisting 
human assumptions of discrimination and hierarchy that machines 
working under capitalism tend to reproduce and reinforce. Instead, 
having accepted machines as ubiquitous, helpful, and necessary 
elements of society, the question becomes, How does machine 
implementation mean a vastly different promise to different 
collectives of people? Is the world of the engineer the same as the 
laborer, the same as the machine? With what framework do we 
describe our affinities with and hatreds of machines, as we so often 
learn from their vision?
In a political climate where machines operate pervasively and 
abundantly, on great and small scales, the precise role of human 
beings as operators, users, or conductors and the according social 
formations of humans alongside machines remain unresolved. The 
ideological messianism of social network politics, the belief in the 
powers of Big Data, the governance of algorithms, those individual 
habits formed alongside mass- produced devices, or the materiality 
and unequal availability of technological infrastructure— each 
scenario is politically familiar yet demands a new critique that 
distills how individuals have become reticulated as collectives 
within a thoroughly technologized landscape. Then, machines at 
scale both offer and demand a kind of social thinking about 
collectives of people and technology that operate seen and unseen, 
unconsciously embodied and actively felt. The mass- produced, 
xilarge- or micro- scale machine forces us to intersect and replace 
categories of social analysis that relate the individual to familiar 
groupings— like the subject to the nation— with novel modes of 
thinking across the singular and plural. For example, is “nationalist 
fervor” an appropriate description for those numerous Apple 
fans excited by the release of a new iPhone? How are biometric 
databases and technologies at once detecting and creating 
collectives, and are these machines useful, safeguarding, or simply 
discriminatory? What are “circadian rhythms” in a world with high- 
frequency trading, the uniformity of Google Spanner, Runtastic’s 
development of an iPhone app for dream betterment, or Netflix’s 
venture into wearable technology that pauses your film when you 
fall asleep? What is labor when factories are mobile, prefabricated, 
and autonomous or when social networks mine the reticulated 
composition of human relationships for value? Critical inquiry into 
machines operating at speed and scale is increasingly necessary, as 
not all engineers are civil.
Taking up this project from different perspectives, this book 
questions the contemporary status of the machine as a political 
configuration of the individual to the technical and the collective. 
Focusing on “animate,” Gertrud Koch looks at the pathological 
relationships that develop between people and technology. 
Questioning an ontological distinction between humans and 
machines, she locates the contemporary practice of “performance 
capture” in film within a longer technological history describing 
the technical connections interfacing humans and machines as 
ontologically operative. By turning from technological distinction 
to functionality, the technical animation of the world is tied to a 
dynamic development of the human. Conceptually, Koch frames 
the animating human as a formal medium of perception achieved 
through a polyvalent interchange found in the relation between the 
personal use of machines and the natural surface of the world that 
technological thinking surfaces as axiomatic. This, however, leaves 
an open question: what is the role of beauty in the function of a 
machine?
xii In his articulation of an “automatic society,” Bernard Stiegler 
discerns a governance of “hypercontrol” that follows from the his-
torical installment of digital media networks. In place of functions 
previously tackled by the mind, the processes of mathematical 
automation that are externalized in digital technology operate 
without human direction and oversight. This externalization of 
formerly internal cognitive operations supplements the thought of 
large populations by automatically rendering each user as an indi-
vidual and collective at once, through shared psychical experience 
mediated by social technology. Within this singular yet interlaced 
vision of society, for Stiegler, is a new proletariat of knowledge 
workers who are mnemotechnically captured and industrially auto-
mated. According to this paradigm of intellectual and informational 
capital, there are new arrangements of conceptual production that 
are consequential symptoms of an automatic society: the Anthro-
pocene and Chris Anderson’s “The End of Theory.” Yet, there is also 
a latent cure, as Stiegler posits the internet as a possibly redemp-
tive pharmakon. Closing with a meditation on the potential for 
reclaiming human agency, he describes a substitutional paradigm 
of a “negentropic” society that would hold the potential to release 
network culture from its automatic force.
Thomas Pringle describes the history of the “ecosystem” as a 
machinic term that allows conceptual traffic between the study of 
ecology and economy. Set against the background of twentieth- 
century technoscience, the ecosystem takes on a new political 
valence given its operation in resource management, national 
security, and environmental economic planning. Tracing the term 
alongside theoretical efforts to describe the operation of power as 
an ecology composed between the poles of mind, technology, and 
environment, he resolves in a sustained engagement with how the 
term resurfaces organicist social orientations. Most recently, this 
vitalism and its relationship to political economy take the form of 
“resilience”: a policy discourse developed from the ecosystem that 
seeks to strategically adapt finances and security to conditions of 
ecological turbulence and disequilibrium.
xiiiIn each case, the author sees room for machine— or its animating/
automating qualities— to operate as a term of media analysis giving 
specific attention to contemporary technosocial politics. Each 
author carefully avoids the pitfalls of Promethean, techno- utopian, 
and technological determinist perspectives in favor of positions 
that balance the machine on a finely nuanced line between the 
singular and the plural, the ideological and the scientific, the tech-
nological and the functional. While machines do hold the power 
to capture individuals, the authors seek critical positions from 
which the agency of the human is not dismissed in advance and life 
alongside technology can be repaired. However, a central problem 
and difference between entries remain in the degree to which each 
critic seeks to gain distance from, or proximity to, the technologies 
under analysis, as machines inevitably place pressure on the pro-
duction of theoretical knowledge. With this reflexive notice in mind, 
perhaps it’s best to begin with pragmatic words of advice from the 
engineer that could be useful for any future sorcerer’s apprentice: 
to understand recursion, one must first understand recursion.
Reference
Chiang, Ted. 2002. “Seventy- Two Letters.” In Stories of Your Life and Others, 147– 200.  
New York: Tor.

[ 1 ]
Animation	of	the	
Technical and the Quest 
for	Beauty
Gertrud Koch
The	Human	Body	as	Generic	Form:	 
On	Anthropomorphism	in	Media
In the Aristotelian view of the generic, species is defined as a 
distinct, classificatory term, while generic form is distinguished as a 
“preliminary step” to a “specific form.” This includes, for instance, 
the “perceptive faculty” as a “generic form” of human beings. It 
makes us into the tasting, smelling, hearing, seeing, and feeling be-
ings that are generated in these perceptions, without this already 
being sufficient to define us as members of a specific species.
The perceptive faculty as a generic form of the human being would 
therefore be what links humans with other animals, a common 
form of being- in- the- world as a concrete body. But we can also 
describe the difference between the various forms of living beings 
with regard to their differently developed capacities. The generic 
form of the perceptive faculty can link an octopus with a human 
being without having to subsume the two under the same develop-
mental tendency. In this respect, generic forms are nonteleological. 
If we start from this model, then we can conceive of further 
2 generic forms of perception, such as perspective or the ability to 
distinguish being light and shadow. The latter allows us to see 
shadows as images, unrelated to whether we can also feel them in 
the warm– cold distinction. The shadow itself can also be regarded 
as a further generic form that allows for various other distinctions. 
It can be viewed as an image, as a spectacle of nature, as a shadow 
play converted into a fixed form with rules, as artificial play, and so 
on. Film, for example, can make use of both varieties of the shadow 
in its aesthetic operations. This need not imply the emergence of 
lower and higher forms of the shadow— or that film has a greater 
capacity to exhaust the generic form of the shadow.
What might the term generic form explain? It can be distinguished 
from other terms like open form or operation. While the open form 
is a definition of form that refers to its semantic unfinished quality, 
the operation is defined in terms of its production aesthetics, that 
is, pragmatically, referring in its aesthetics to the artistic act. In con-
trast, we should use generic form to designate the initiating function 
of particular perceptions, which are neither random (we cannot see 
everything, but only in perspectival scales, for instance, no shadows 
without light) nor obligatory (in a three- dimensional space with 
light and shadow, for instance, I can only have “eyes” for a graphic 
ground pattern or mainly sense cold). These generic forms of the 
perceptive faculty turn from the sensory to the aesthetic when 
they apply perceptions as accentuations that simultaneously take 
recourse in the world of the perceptible while fictionalizing it (x 
emerges from the shadows) or instilling it with imaginative qualities 
(“faces in the cloud,”1 etc.).
If we understand generic forms in this sense, as formative forms 
that nonteleologically unfold toward a final stage, which charac-
terizes a fluid dynamic of forms, this would then imply revising the 
ontological status of forms. For forms that unfold teleologically 
strive for an end point that can be explicitly defined. If we aban-
don this idea, then we also must define a new understanding of 
ontology in the context of the term generic form, one that includes 
the operative aspects that precede semantization.
3In the following, I view the human body as a medium of the human 
“perceptive faculty” under the dual aspect of the generic form 
and operative ontology— behind this concept are concepts and 
ideas from the philosophies of media, technology, and culture that 
attempt to reconceive the relationship between nature– culture– 
human and technology. The human perceptive faculty, however, 
not only differs from that of the octopus in purely biological terms, 
for instance, but also because of its relations. The human percep-
tive faculty is not only directed at our natural surroundings but also 
itself makes use of all kinds of machines, apparatuses, and technol-
ogies that, roughly speaking, operatively define what human beings 
are, in and through our perceptive faculty, in relation to the world 
of technology as much as to our “natural” biological configuration.
In many discourses, these areas where human beings and ma-
chines are linked become made into binary odd couples. Wherever 
there is technology, the grass of nature can no longer grow; where 
there is culture, we are alienated from nature; wherever nature 
exists, culture stops; under the sign of the age of technology arises 
a technocracy, the dominance of technical- calculating functional 
thinking, which suffocates the organically grown living world in the 
chilling grasp of functional administrative rationality, banishing 
the individual to that “shell of bondage” (stahlharte Gehäuse der 
Hörigkeit) evoked by Max Weber. In his writings in Economy and 
Society, Weber (1978, 1402) introduces the machine metaphor in a 
double pack when he writes,
An inanimate machine is mind objectified. Only this pro-
vides it with the power to force men into its service and 
to dominate their everyday working life so completely as 
is actually the case in the factory. Objectified intelligence 
is also that animated machine, the bureaucratic organi-
zation, with its specialization of trained skills, its division 
of jurisdiction, its rules and hierarchical relations of au-
thority. Together with the inanimate machine it is busy 
fabricating the shell of bondage which men will perhaps 
be forced to inhabit some day, as powerless as the fellahs 
4 of ancient Egypt. This might happen if a technically supe-
rior administration were to be the ultimate and sole value 
in the ordering of their affairs, and that means: a rational 
bureaucratic administration with the corresponding wel-
fare benefits, for this bureaucracy can accomplish much 
better than any other structure of domination.
The inanimate and the animate machine together produce that 
Procrustean bed on which each individual is held and threatened 
to tear that individual apart. The prognostic vision of the bourgeois 
individual, who in the end is swallowed by the apparatus of dom-
ination, much like the Egyptian fellahs were with enslavement by 
the machine, belongs to the ironclad stock of cultural and social 
theory in which the “machine”— the “apparatus”— is conceived 
in opposition to the individual. Whether it is precisely the “spirit 
of Protestantism” that “is objectified” in the doubled machine of 
technological production and administrative state will here be left 
to Max Weber studies and to the history of religion. What contin-
ues to be in effect to this day is Weber’s thesis of rationalization, 
regardless of any individual objections— even if it has often been 
reduced and battered into cultural- critical formulas that can no 
longer maintain the vehemence of Weber’s thesis.
These litanies are long and familiar. In them the complex architec-
ture of modern society is reduced to an apocalyptic power struggle 
between distinct camps and parties— and the osmotic connections 
between the areas are no longer perceived or are only helplessly 
experienced as impenetrable brush. Machines are then assessed 
to be overpowering and headstrong, without being able or even 
wanting to separate ourselves from them.
But kicking the car, patting the closed computer laptop, wildly 
pressing random keys, or frantically calling out hello into your 
malfunctioning iPhone— these minor pathologies of everyday life 
and their outbursts of irrational behavior tell a different story: the 
rocky relationship in which humans and machines are stuck. If we 
follow the symptoms, then we see that it comes down to problems 
5of living together, or trouble in the relationship. At least the patho-
logical kick to the machine knows that it is entering into a relation-
ship with the machine, even if it is a negative and destructive one. 
And yet, our pathological relationship to the machine points to an 
affective knowledge that acknowledges mutual interdependence. 
The machine wants to be used correctly, carefully installed and 
maintained, and understood in its abilities. If these conditions are 
not fulfilled and the interplay with the machine is troubled, the 
relationship to the machine is negative. The possibility of imagining 
our relation to technology as a relationship that we have with 
machines has been compared with the work of a conductor by 
the French psychologist and philosopher Gilbert Simondon (2017, 
17– 18):
Far from being the supervisor of a group of slaves, man is 
the permanent organizer of a society of technical objects 
that need him in the same way musicians in an orches-
tra need a conductor. The conductor can only direct the 
musicians because he plays the piece in the same way 
they do, as intensely as they all do; he tempers or hurries 
them, but is also tempered or hurried by them; in fact, it 
is through the conductor that the members of the orches-
tra temper or hurry one another, he is the moving and 
current form of the group as it exists for each of them; 
he is the mutual interpreter of all of them in relation to 
one another. Man thus has the function of being the per-
manent coordinator and inventor of the machines that 
surround him. He is among the machines that operate 
with him.
Simondon recommends a different way of dealing with machines, 
which are not our externalizable Other or beings from another 
world that have occupied our own, but which exist with us in a 
single world, which belong to us, and which define us in the way we 
define and view them as belonging to us. Simondon substantiates 
this relationship with a further metaphor in which he sees us as 
“translating between the machines.” This unavoidable dynamic in 
6 the relationship between human being and machine makes any 
strict ontological distinction between us impossible, for the way 
technological objects exist is not related to any other world, as we 
define ourselves with and through machines: there are operative 
ontologies that are produced and altered in our practical dealings 
with machines.
It is uncontested that our natural faculties have not essentially 
changed in evolutionary terms since the beginning of the species, 
and yet by now we can do certain things as a species that we 
learned through our interactions with machines. For instance, 
our ways of traveling have expanded since we learned to walk 
upright. We can now also move across long stretches in the air or 
over water; we can wash our blood with the aid of machines and 
attach an iron lung to breathe with. Using optical aids, we can see 
from all sides, look around the corner, see in the dark, and so on. 
This means that we invent technological objects that constantly 
alter our anthropological conditions and thus human ontology and 
the way human beings exist. By assuming this position, cultural 
technologies could be defined as practices of dealing with techno-
logical objects and artifacts of all kinds, which constantly reframe 
our understanding of ourselves. This is the sense in which Weber 
(1978, 65) also regarded the term technology as a term of action 
when he wrote,
The “technique” of an action refers to the means em-
ployed as opposed to the meaning or end to which the ac-
tion is, in the last analysis, oriented. “Rational” technique 
is a choice of means which is consciously and system-
atically oriented to the experience and reflection of the 
actor, which consists, at the highest level of rationality, in 
scientific knowledge. What is concretely to be treated as 
a “technique” is thus variable. The ultimate meaning of 
a concrete act may, seen in the total context of action, be 
of a “technical” order; that is, it may be significant only as 
a means in this broader context. Then the “meaning” of 
the concrete act (viewed from the larger context) lies in its 
7technical function; and conversely, the means which are 
applied in order to accomplish this are its “techniques.” In 
this sense there are techniques of every conceivable type 
of action, techniques of prayer, of asceticism, of thought 
and research, of memorizing, or education, or exercising 
political or hierocractic domination, of administration, of 
making love, of making war, of musical performances, of 
sculpture and painting, or arriving at legal decisions. All 
of these are capable of the widest variation in degree of 
rationality. 
“What is concretely to be treated as a ‘technique’ is thus variable,” 
writes Weber (65). Techniques are therefore instances of an action 
that are part of a wider context into which they merge. Machines 
can become part of techniques, for instance, of traveling, of writing 
down, of transmitting sound and light waves, which would make 
them media that performatively intervene in our action by facili-
tating or torpedoing certain techniques. In this respect, there is a 
paradigm change: machines are no longer extensions of organs, as 
older anthropologists thought (Arnold Gehlen, etc.), but agents in 
a field of techniques and part of a network of relations. And often 
enough, they are a pathologically distorted relation: the fact that 
worn- out goods take their toll on us every day— for instance, when 
an easily broken handle puts an otherwise usable machine out of 
service— points to economic calculations already in a machine’s 
production that convert its function from mechanical- technical 
to economic. Here as well, the technological malfunction of the 
machine indicates a disturbance in the social relationship to it 
and its users. In such a pragmatic reading, the demonization of 
the machine would vanish as much as would the fetishization that 
sticks to it in its form as commodity.
Being inventive in our dealings with machines, which we find so 
difficult in our everyday lives, since it is often already foreclosed in 
production, marks the aesthetic relationship to the machine and, 
according to Weber (1978, 67), is fundamental to the emergence of 
technology, for
8 the fact that what is called the technological development 
of modern times has been so largely oriented economi-
cally to profit- making is one of the fundamental facts of 
the history of technology. But however fundamental it has 
been, this economic orientation has by no means stood 
alone in shaping the development of technology. In addi-
tion, a part has been played by the games and cogitations 
of impractical ideologists, a part by other- worldly interests 
and all sorts of fantasies, a part by preoccupation with 
artistic problems, and by various other non- economic 
motives.
If we read this passage with Simondon in mind, then we notice 
that there is a technological reference back to art and game, in 
Weber as a historical source, in Simondon in the metaphor of the 
conductor. In the following, I would now like to use two examples 
in an attempt to show how the human body as a medium of the 
generic form “perceptive faculty,” becomes activated in the field 
of aesthetic objects, thus shifting the ontological definitions of the 
form “human being.” Second, I would like to use the examples to 
show paradigmatically how the ontology of man and machine op-
eratively relates the one to the other in our technological dealings 
with machines, thus bringing a kind of fluidity to both rigid ontol-
ogies, which operate with a logic of subsumption. The “perceptive 
faculty,” as a generic form of the human being, is then itself dis-
placed into an interplay between perception of the self and of the 
(surrounding) world. The “perceptive faculty” of machines becomes 
perceptible in the playful interaction with their “conductor,” thus 
becoming aestheticized and thematized as aesthetic objects.
A	Case	Study:	Why	Should	Andy	Serkis	 
Get an Oscar?
Andy Serkis is a British theater and film actor, known above all for 
his roles that present purely cinematographic beings— fictional 
characters that can no longer be cloaked in the corporeal shell of 
an actor but are new hybrid creations consisting of an interplay 
9between the human capacities to move, perform, and express with 
computer- generated image production. Concretely, this means that 
we as spectators see and hear Andy Serkis in the role of the giant 
ape King Kong in the film of the same name, as Gollum (from the 
Lord of the Rings film trilogy [2001– 3] and The Hobbit: An Unexpect-
ed Journey [2012]), as an insurgent ape in the Planet of the Apes 
film series, and yet we do not see and hear Serkis in the same way 
that we see him as Othello on stage in Great Britain or in live- action 
films in his physical form. What appears before us is the result of 
complex interaction of man, machine, and technology. The pro-
duction of the Gollum figure shows how the process of becoming a 
character in a fantasy film develops as the interplay of a theatrical 
performance and mechanical transmissions technology, which 
transfers the gestures, facial expressions, and body movements 
of the actor to machines as material references so that these can 
be used to create a morphological shaping of computer- generated 
images. The process is called performance capture and is a further 
development of motion capture.
The “technical” advance made between the two films lies in an im-
provement in plasticity and in the character’s carnality, applied by 
means of digital makeup, muscles, and layers of skin, all oriented 
[Figure 1.1.] “Creating Gollum” by naturevideo (YouTube screenshot).
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to the physical qualities of the human body and thus representing 
the attempt to get fantasy artifacts to appear as muscled bodies, 
speaking with a human voice. The movements and the “carnality” 
of the computer- generated bodies create the allusion to human 
bodies and arise as a mimesis of them. The melding of live- action 
film (filmed with actors on location) and the animated world of 
special effects dissolves the boundaries of space, thus creating a 
permanent change in the ontology of what is seen as human or as 
a human environment. In the end, it is the fusion of the physical 
body with the machine- generated one that seems to claim that the 
humanity of human beings is not found in its proximity to nature 
but in their interaction with the machine, which produces a new 
idea of the image of the human being that both arises out of its 
creative cohabitation with machines and reflects on this as well.
When the live- action actor James Franco, who is Andy Serkis’s 
colleague in the film Rise of the Planet of the Apes (2011), claims 
that Serkis deserves an Oscar for his portrayal of the ape Caesar, 
the provocation lies in how, for the first time, recognition is being 
demanded for the fact that the creation of an animated character 
is not solely due to the work of machines and their technical cus-
todians but lives from a mimesis that is at least double: that of an 
[Figure 1.2.] “Creating Gollum” by naturevideo (YouTube screenshot).
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actor with regard to the fiction (the role) and that of the machine 
with regard to the actor. This has changed the discourse. We like to 
separate live- action film from computer- generated film in terms of 
their ontology, which is why Oscars are given either to actors or to 
technicians, or sometimes to whole studios specialized in special 
effects, although techniques have long since been formed in the 
practical use of machines that have this fusion as their goal.
This was James Franco’s (2012) plea, who played the scientist as live 
action opposite Andy Serkis in his role as the insurgent ape Caesar:
Andy doesn’t need me to tell him he is an innovator, 
he knows it. What is needed is recognition for him, 
now. Not later when this kind of acting is de rigueur, but 
now, when he has elevated this fresh mode of acting into 
an art form. And it is time for actors to give credit to other 
actors. It is easy to praise the technical achievements of 
this film, but those achievements would be empty with-
out Andy. Caesar is not a character that is dependent on 
human forms of expression to deliver the emotion of the 
character: despite the lack of any human gestures, and 
maybe two or three words of human speech Caesar is a 
[Figure 1.3.] “Rise of the Planet of the Apes Featurette” by Weta Digital (YouTube  
screenshot).
12 fully realized character, not human, and not quite ape; 
this is no Lassie and this is no Roger Rabbit, it is the cre-
ation of an actor doing something that I dare say no other 
actor could have done at this moment.
And he could only do it by interacting with the machine, which is 
also neither ape nor human being but a technological object that 
interacts with us. In this interaction, the old questions of ontology 
are operatively re- posed: animal, human, machine enter into mi-
metic exchange processes. Just like the meowing of the cat, which 
is quiet “by nature,” is mimesis of human language, the computer- 
supported image of the human being is mimesis of both the 
machine and the human being. We would like to know more about 
both human and machine, for we already don’t know anymore 
and probably will never be able to know what they are, but we can 
observe and analyze and try to capture conceptually what they are 
like.
It was not strictly necessary to propose my outline here as some 
special case of the cinematographic, such as performance capture. 
I could also have taken recourse in the “old” unresolved cases, for 
instance, in films by the silent film comedian Buster Keaton, who 
was one of the first to take the role of conductor, which I have cited 
from Simondon, and turn it into a poetics of the slapstick film of 
technical objects. Not only because he, as film director, is embod-
ied as a performer by the machines of the cinema (above all the 
camera) but because, in addition, he transforms this relationship 
between man and machine in the events that occur on the film 
screen into an aesthetic way of existing, which he produces by 
combining human and mechanical bodies as an ingenious dance. 
Or I could refer to the video works of Bill Viola (1986), who carries 
out a complex visual work on human and animal gazes by reflect-
ing himself toward the camera in the eye of a bird in his work I Do 
Not Know What It Is I Am Like (1986).
On the surface, we see the reflection of the cameraman on the 
bird’s pupil as it looks directly into the camera. But the images 
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made possible by the technical processes of digitization are also 
reflections of the self— a self- portrait of the artist— who responds 
to the animal’s gaze with a projection of his own image. He 
thus presents himself along with a machine, without which this 
self- portrait would not be possible. Indeed, the self- portrait is 
presented with the digital camera, which we see along with him as 
a symbiotic unity in the self- portrait on the bird’s pupil, but also in 
those shots that divide the video’s chapters and show Bill Viola at 
his electronic editing table and computer, where the video is made.
In his writings, Viola himself refers to video and computer tech-
nology as a way to enable the further development of the self and 
of self- understanding. Viola insists on using the latest machines 
and software because they stem from the dynamic interaction of 
man and machine and therefore belong to the generic form of 
the “perceptive faculty.” “The level of use of the tools is a direct 
reflection of the level of the user. Chopsticks can either be a simple 
eating utensil or a deadly weapon, depending on who uses them” 
(Viola, quoted in Perloff 1998, 320). Marjorie Perloff correctly uses 
[Figure 1.4.] I Do Not Know What It Is I Am Like by Bill Viola (film screenshot).
14 this citation to point to the pragmatic side in Viola and to define 
his poetics. Above all, it is in video technology’s provenance from 
live broadcasting, even before video had been developed as a 
recording medium, that Viola justifies its greater proximity to the 
living. In “Between How and Why,” Viola (1995, 62– 63) writes,
One of the most fascinating aspects of video’s technical 
evolution, and the one that makes it most different from 
film, is that the video image existed for many years before 
a way was developed to record it. . . . Taping or recording 
is not an integral part of the system. Film is not film un-
less it is filming (recording). Video, however, is “videoing” 
all the time, continually in motion, putting out 30 frames, 
or images, a second. . . . Video’s roots in the live, not record-
ed, is the underlying characteristic of the medium. . . .  When 
one makes a videotape, one is interfering with an ongoing 
process, the scanning of the camera. . . . In film . . . the 
basic illusion is of movement, produced by the succession 
of still images flashing on the screen. In video, stillness 
is the basic illusion: a still image does not exist because 
the video signal is in constant motion scanning across the 
screen.
Viola’s self- portrait in I Do Not Know What It Is I Am Like was literally 
created as the interface of a machine, the digital camera, video 
technology, and Viola’s work at the computer. The technē is his 
art— the art of recognizing oneself in the mirror— which the ma-
chine provides for him, becoming a surface in nature on which to 
project. Although Viola may see his relationship to nature different-
ly, he brings forth an image as a physical object in the triangulation 
of man– machine– animal that comes from fusing three bodies and 
which yields an image of that fusion.
Perloff (1998, 321) concludes her essay with the words “artists like 
Viola are rediscovering the function of art as a form of practical 
knowledge— in Plato’s words in the Ion, techne kai episteme.” And 
so I would like to conclude this case study, not by turning to 
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Platonism, against which the concept of “operative ontology” and 
of “generic form” are in fact aimed, but by stressing the contents 
of the formula technē kai epistēmē, which does not define art/
technologies as the other of awareness but as a connection. 
Technologies are practical knowledge that we fabricate by dealing 
with machines. The human body functions in this as a medium that 
takes on the “generic form of the perceptive faculty.”
Beauty	and	Technology:	The	Aesthetic	 
Question	of	Technical	Objects
The relationship between art and technology has a long concep-
tual history that focuses primarily on the technical aspects of 
production, emphasizing the experimental character of both. 2 
Often art is defined as technical itself in the sense of technē— or as 
negation of the instrumental character of technical functionalism 
by emphasizing the aspect of play. Both definitions fail to grasp the 
dialectic that spans between the two terms of art and technology. 
Art produces in its techniques something immaterial; the beautiful 
[Figure 1.5.] I Do Not Know What It Is I Am Like by Bill Viola (film screenshot).
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in, irons one can’t iron with, fires one can’t extinguish, dead one 
can’t bury, bursts of violence one can’t stop or share. In art’s aes-
thetic operations, all things natural or artificial can become mate-
rial, and despite its function, art energizes its own transformation 
into something “beautiful” following the modi of sensual percep-
tion. The binary opposition of beautiful– ugly shrinks: even the ugly, 
the bitter, the painful, gains in its aesthetic appearance an affect of 
a second order, such as pleasure in horror or lust for disgust.
The	Beautiful	and	the	Fetish
The beautiful appearance becomes, in these aesthetic operations 
of making, an excess that changes functional objects into art ob-
jects. The beautiful appearance produces a surplus value: to func-
tion beauty adds value to the object. This value has an economic 
determination: now the technical object is not only practical but 
also beautiful. That’s why Apple products are more expensive than 
other electronic objects of the same functional type. This economic 
theory formulates beauty as a “shine” that makes objects appear 
as something precious and considers the beautiful as a function of 
the “shine.” It produces an enchantment, as though a kind of white 
magic, that makes the beautiful into a fetish in the same sense as 
Karl Marx argued in his influential chapter on the fetish character 
of commodity. Marx argued that the fetish emerges where the 
commodity is no longer seen as produced by invested labor but 
only mediated by its price.
I recall a curious example in which something inaccessibly expen-
sive appears as a beautiful object of desire: like everywhere in the 
globalized media world, game shows run on all channels in the 
People’s Republic of China. These shows often ask the participants 
to do humiliating things that leave them as losers at the end. The 
nonsense of play differs nevertheless from these games insofar as 
there is a winner at the end and there is a material object that can 
be won— the competition aims for a commodity of high value, or 
sometimes blunt cash. Humiliation comes as the price to possibly 
17attain something that one couldn’t afford otherwise— one could 
argue that there is a moment of corruption or prostitution involved 
as a price is paid in order to exhibit someone’s lust for an object 
of desire. In one of these shows, the main prize was a big BMW 
limousine— a status symbol of the new rich class in China— and in 
the preparation for the contest, a young female worker was asked 
why she volunteers for such an endeavor that would probably 
harm her. Her equally stupefying and illuminating answer was “I’d 
rather cry in a BMW than smile on a bike.”3
One can read this sybillinic answer as pointing to the privilege 
of the well- heeled, as to be unhappy behind the closed curtains 
of their fancy limousines contrasts with the poor bicyclists who 
have no chance for a private moment and must show a public 
smile. But one can also read this anecdote as intensification of 
the melancholic state that comes with the twisted desires that the 
commodity fetish evokes— the spell over labor as a precondition 
of the artifact and the worker that can’t reach his work becoming 
melancholic. The fetish character of the commodity is based on the 
repression of its material foundation in labor and machinery. Like 
how the fetish in magical practice operates on the paradox that it is 
at the same time self- made and fabricated but also entails external 
magic animated power, the commodity becomes fetish insofar as it 
appears to those who fabricated it as something magical.
Walter Benjamin (1999, 10) described this relationship as the 
becoming- image of the commodity:
But precisely modernity is always citing primal history. 
Here, this occurs through the ambiguity peculiar to the 
social relations and products of this epoch. Ambiguity is 
the appearance of dialectic in images, the law of dialectics 
at a standstill. This standstill is utopia and the dialectical 
image, therefore, dream image. Such an image is afforded 
by the commodity per se: as fetish.
To cry in a BMW, within property that still doesn’t gain a concrete 
value, is a BMW at standstill. Having the BMW will not change the 
18 life conditions of a worker into one of the elite, as even the use- 
value of the limousine may be limited in the hands of a worker who 
has neither the time nor the means to enjoy such an item. Insofar 
as the fetish shrinks back into the abstract exchange- value in the 
medium of money, the end of the dream— or only as a dream 
image— is the fetish as a sign of happiness. The happiness of 
uselessness is the possession of a beautiful limousine that doesn’t 
necessarily entail any use as technical object.
A modern aesthetic that poses the question about the value of art 
draws itself into the paradoxes between two concepts of value. 
Benjamin brings this question to the table in a quote he takes from 
Adorno. Benjamin (1999, 669– 70), in his notes for the Passagen- 
Werk, quotes Adorno’s essay “Fragments on Wagner” from 1939 
with a significant reflection on this relationship:
The art of Wagner’s orchestration has banished . . . the 
role of the immediate production of sound from the aes-
thetic totality. . . . Anyone fully able to grasp why Haydn 
doubles the violins with a flute in piano might get an 
intuitive glimpse into why, thousands of years ago, men 
gave up eating uncooked grain and began to bake bread, 
or why they started to smooth and polish their tools. All 
trace of its own production should ideally disappear from 
the object of consumption. It should look as though it had 
never been made, so as not to reveal that the one who 
sells it did not in fact make it, but rather appropriated to 
himself the labor that went into it. The autonomy of art 
has its origin in the concealment of labor.
Adorno states a dialectical relation between compulsory labor that 
is necessary to sustain our lives, or the appropriation of labor via 
the market, and the free work of art that remains illusionary in 
sheer “shine,” but by shining, it indirectly points to its repressed 
basis. Benjamin cites Adorno within the framework of his own 
occupation with Marx’s idea of commodity fetishism, where he 
looks at the commodities in the Parisian passages as surrealistic 
emanations— or one could say Benjamin looks at them as if they 
19were works of art detached from the traces of labor. He reactivates 
Marx’s (1906) famous discussion in Capital about the fetish charac-
ter of the commodity, as Marx claims:
There it is a definite social relation between men, that 
assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation 
between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, 
we must have recourse to the mist- enveloped regions of 
the religious world. In that world the productions of the 
human brain appear as independent beings endowed 
with life, and entering into relation both with one another 
and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities 
with the products of men’s hands. This I call the Fetishism 
which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as 
they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore 
inseparable from the production of commodities. (83)
Adorno’s conclusion that autonomous art has at its origin the 
blurring of labor is not only illuminating regarding the reception of 
Marx in the first generation of the Frankfurt school but astonishing 
insofar that it discovers aesthetic potential in the few pages of 
Marx’s fetish chapter. Adorno leads us to a complex grid in which 
the relation between bodily work, technical production, and the 
autonomous appearance of aesthetic objects are embedded. His 
look at the value of art through the economic value of production 
is enlightening for the materialist grounding of art in a praxis of 
technical fabrication and work. Autonomy becomes a fragile state 
as it only unfolds as appearance. Insofar as art takes part in the 
production of the illusion of a work- free realm of commodities, it is 
negated at the same time through a delusive character by claiming 
nothing more than just the “shine.” Aesthetic illusion turns into the 
opponent of the delusive character of commodity production.
The	Beautiful	in	the	Technical
In his book The Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, Gilbert 
Simondon (2017, 196) dedicates a small chapter to the correlation 
between technical and aesthetic thinking. Among others, he asks 
20 the question, When are technical objects beautiful? First, he refers 
to those objects that are aesthetically vested in a manner that 
hides their technical qualities:
In fact, technical objects are not inherently beautiful in 
themselves, unless one is seeking a type of presentation 
that answers directly to aesthetic concerns; in this case 
there is a true distance between the technical object 
and the aesthetic object; it is in fact as if there were two 
objects, the aesthetic object enveloping and masking the 
technical object; this is the case for instance when one 
sees a water tower, build near a feudal ruin, camouflaged 
by added crenels and painted the same color as the old 
stone.
But the form of presentation of technical objects is neither the 
beginning nor the end of the possible beauty they have. Simondon 
sees beauty instead in a specific relation to the environment of the 
technical object that allows a correspondence and an accentuation 
instead of blurring:
But in certain cases there is a beauty proper to technical 
objects. This beauty appears when these objects become 
integrated within a world, whether it be geographical or 
human: aesthetic feeling  is then relative to this integra-
tion; it is like a gesture. (196)
Simondon gives as examples electric wires that cling to the land-
scape between two power poles, a car that leans into the curve, 
the canvas that waves in the wind, as “each technical object, mobile 
or fixated, can experience aesthetic epiphany by itself thus far it 
carries the world or fits into it” (172).
Technical objects are not beautiful by themselves but in a constel-
lation that embeds them into a specific place in a landscape, or in 
a specific relationship with the body, or in a specific movement, 
or in a specific flash of signals they send. Simondon puts a lot of 
emphasis on this correlation: (1) the technical object is tied to a 
21specific site (a reservoir dam, a power pole, etc.) and (2) is tied 
to human practice (e.g., electricity generation). Only out of this 
interplay emerges the aesthetic disposition of beauty. The buzzing 
of the power lines over a canyon whose silhouette they mimic, their 
glittering in the sunlight— all these appearances are much less than 
a surreal break with their technical functions than they are a sign 
of their relatedness. From this stems the experience of connected-
ness: from the glittering in the sunlight emerges the shining in the 
dark of illuminated villages and towns— connectedness creates an 
ensemble of imagination, knowledge, and fantasy that lets them 
experience something as beautiful. In this ensemble, the perceiver 
can see himself as inventor and not only as a user of technology 
and its relationship to the world within which it is embedded. The 
aesthetic sensations that come when walking above a big valley 
from where one can observe the movements of the trains, the 
flashing of the metal tracks, the glittering queues of cars down in 
the valley, find in Simondon’s techno- aesthetic some grounds for 
why we experience them as such.
Technology and the technical object gain beauty because they “fit” 
into the world and because they are in the place where they are. 
This points back to Kant’s argument about beauty, mainly that in 
aesthetic experience, we see ourselves as “fitting” into the world. 
Beauty in the sublime of contrast makes us aware of the difference, 
distance, and inaccessibility of nature.
Most of techno- aesthetics are looking for the sublime in 
technology— technology distances us from the sublime and posts 
it as an antagonistic second nature. An example for those aesthetic 
operations are the aesthetics of hardware- infused war battles, of 
horror and science fiction films, in which the technicity of modern 
warfare becomes the agent or the autonomy of the robot- like 
machine appears as an uncanny agent of an alien power. All leave 
the spectator in a state of stupor and horror of powerlessness, not 
to mention the new wave of dystopian films where the big machin-
ery of surveillance gains power over the helpless subjects. Where 
technology is erected as natural force, even it is second to socially 
22 made nature, as technology succumbs to fetishization. The beauty 
of technology is by its nature a beauty of horror and overwhelming 
affect. It becomes fetish where its link to work, labor, and invested 
value is suspended.
In the attempt to look at the techno- aesthetic models of beauty as 
“fit” in the sense of a successful practice of establishing environ-
mental relations in contrast to the distanciating figure of beauty 
as sublime, one may succeed in bridging the rupture between the 
two models in a dialectical figure: the redemptive aspects in the 
variant of “fit” become a utopian sublation of alienation, that which 
confronts us in the fetish as surreal artifact.
Both perspectives on beauty are tainted with some magic, once 
in the enchantment of a praxis that is not yet realized and on the 
other side in the magic promise of happiness that may be covered 
in the work of somebody else, who remains invisible as if by magic 
spell. While the fetish erects the sign of a power that has not yet 
appropriated the model, “fit” is a preview of possible happiness in a 
new practice of life yet to come.
Taking Adorno’s dictum literally, that the “autonomy of art has 
its origin in the concealment of labor” (quoted in Benjamin 1999, 
699), one can look at the aesthetic side of technology and its 
technical objects as the dream of the liquefaction of labor, very 
much in the sense that we can see in Chaplin’s performance in 
Modern Times (1936) when he is first swallowed by the machine and 
then spit out from it as a dream walker on the sidewalks outside 
of the factory. Both in the beautiful appearance of the interplay 
between the human, nature, and technology and in the dystopian 
phantasmagoria, we find the idea that machines in the long run 
will liquidate not only the work to make machines but also the 
workers. Cinema, which is entirely based on this interplay between 
technique, technology, machines, hands, and fantasy, emanates 
historically exactly in the fold where the big inventions of the 
nineteenth century merge: electricity, the motor, transport, and 
media of communication. The beauty of cinema displays two sides: 
23a technical one as practice and one of fetishization as commodity. 
Its beauty is animated by the fetish and we as spectators by the 
beauty it brings afore.
Notes
 1 The phrase is taken from the lovely title of Stewart Guthrie’s (1993) religious- 
anthropological book Faces in the Cloud: A New Theory of Religion.
 2 See my essay “Film as Experiment in Animation: Are Films Experiments on 
Human Beings?” (Koch 2014, 131– 44).
 3 The quote appears in various constellations and translations. See Wang (2016).
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For	a	Neganthropology	 
of	Automatic	Society
Bernard Stiegler
With the advent of reticular reading and writing (Herrenschmidt 
2007) via networks made accessible to everyone through the 
implementation, beginning in 1993, of the technologies of the 
World Wide Web, digital technologies have led hyperindustrial 
societies toward a new stage of proletarianization— through which 
the hyperindustrial age becomes the era of systemic stupidity 
(Stiegler 2013).
This specific age of stupidity is described by Mats Alvesson and 
André Spicer (2012, 1194– 20) as a function of the current stage of 
capitalist management. Stupidity, however, as it is produced by 
a psychical state of stupefaction, as well as by what Adam Smith 
(1937, 734) called “torpor,” is not just a contemporary accident 
imposed by the development of consumerist and speculative 
capitalism. It is what technological changes always produce, as 
they provoke what I call a doubly epokhal redoubling, where a new 
stage of technological development interrupts and suspends social 
rules and behaviors and thereby destroys social systems (in the 
sense of Niklas Luhmann and Bertrand Gille).
Such is also the case for digital networks. But through the latter, 
stupefaction and stupidity are being installed in a new and function-
al way: in such a way that disruption can structurally and systemically 
26 short- circuit and bypass the knowledge of psychic and collective 
individuals. This is what will here be called “systemic stupidity.”
Remote action networks (and networks of tele- objectivity; Berns 
and Rouvroy 2013, 165) make it possible to massively delocalize 
production units, to form and remotely control huge markets, to 
structurally separate industrial capitalism and financial capitalism, 
and to permanently interconnect electronic financial markets, 
using applied mathematics to automate the “financial industry” 
and control these markets in real time. Processes of automated 
decision- making become functionally tied to drive- based automa-
tisms, controlling consumer markets through the mediation of the 
mass media and, today, through the industry of traces that is the 
so- called data economy (that is, the economy of personal data).
Digital automatons have succeeded in short- circuiting the delib-
erative functions of the mind, and systemic stupidity, which has 
been installed across the board from consumers to speculators, 
becomes functionally drive based, pitting one against the other 
(hence this goes well beyond that “functional stupidity” described 
by Alvesson and Spicer 2012).
In the last few years, however, and specifically after 2008, a state 
of generalized stupefaction1 seems to have arisen that accompanies 
this systemic bêtise, this functional stupidity.
This stupor has been caused by a series of technological shocks that 
emerged from the digital turn of 1993. The revelation of these 
shocks, and of their major features and consequences, has brought 
about a state that now verges on stunned paralysis— in particular, 
in the face of the hegemonic power of Google, Apple, Facebook, 
and Amazon (Nusca 2010), four companies that are literally dis- 
integrating the industrial societies that emerged from the Aufklärung. 
The result has been what I have referred to as a feeling of “net 
blues,” which is spreading among those who had believed or do 
believe in the promises of the digital era.
27Today, the artifactual sphere that is constituted by technical 
individuation tends to operate as a process of total automatization, 
whose figure is the robot. The stage of total automatization is the 
most recent stage of the ongoing process of grammatization, that 
is, of the discretization and technical reproduction of human fluxes 
and flows— of which writing (Plato’s pharmakon) is one stage and 
the machine tool is another stage (one founded on Vaucanson’s 
automatons), and where the digital extends this to every sphere 
of existence, in all human societies that currently subsist— the 
question being to know if societies in the sense of collective individ-
uation processes can survive such a process of automatization.
Automatism repeats. And if it is true that technical life is no longer 
governed by instincts but by drives, then to think automatic 
repetition, we must refer to Freud’s discoveries in 1920, discoveries 
which, passing through Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, constituted the 
ground of Deleuze’s (1994) meditation on the relationship between 
difference and repetition, where the automatism of repetition 
(or repetition as the condition of possibility of all automatism) 
is presented essentially as a pharmacological question (Deleuze 
would prefer to say “problem”), for
if we die of repetition we are also saved and healed by 
it— healed, above all, by the other repetition. The whole 
mystical game of loss and salvation is therefore contained 
in repetition, along with the whole theatrical game of 
life and death and the whole positive game of illness and 
health. (6– 7)
That what Deleuze sees as repetition is capable of producing a 
difference (that is, an individuation) but also a baseness (which oc-
curs when we disindividuate), however, means that this repetition 
presupposes technical exteriorization, that is, grammatization as the 
possibility of a repetition that is neither biological nor psychic, via the 
hypomnesic and pharmacological support of repetition that grants 
a difference, that is, an individuation (and a différance) as well as 
a baseness, that is, an indifference and a disindividuation (in what 
28 Simondon and Deleuze also describe as an “interindividuality,” 
whereby the transindividual loses meaning, being no longer a prein-
dividual potential for individuation but merely a formal signification 
through which the group regresses and falls into baseness).
In the nineteenth century, grammatization, which is the technical 
history of the repetition of discretized mental and behavioral flows 
(flows that are in this sense grammatized), which is the history of 
the technical power of repetition, leads to automation, which Marx 
described in the Grundrisse, and this constitutes a turning point in 
the history of repetition— given that today, in industrial capitalism, 
economic development will occur only on the condition of putting “bad 
repetition” to work— that is, by implementing the kinds of repetition 
that result in baseness and indifference.
Life has had many epochs: the epoch of bacteria, of archaea, 
of protists and other singled- celled eukaryotes, right up to the 
aggregations of cells and organs that we are ourselves— ourselves, 
that is, these multicellular beings who cannot do without nonliving 
organs, artifacts, prostheses, and, eventually, today, automata. As 
I prepared for this conference, for example, I searched among the 
masses of tertiary retentions, which are mnemotechnical traces, 
and which we (living technicians) have produced for two million 
years (and organized in the form of knowledge), in order to find 
out about archaea, using Google and then Wikipedia, the latter 
being a collaboratively produced site, although what is usually 
forgotten is that it is also highly reliant on so- called bots, which is 
an abbreviation for robots, when, by the latter, we mean logical 
and algorithmic automatons that are “mainly used to perform 
repetitive tasks that automation allows to be performed at high 
speed.”
The differentiation of the living unfolds from the parthenogenesis 
of single- celled organisms right up to the higher vertebrates like 
ourselves, endowed with both an endoskeleton and an exoskeleton 
and surrounded by the exo- organisms and organizations that are 
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artificial organs, and passing along the way through the sexuation 
of multicellular bodies lacking a nervous system, such as plants, 
through invertebrate animals protected by an exoskeleton, such as 
the snail, the crab, the insect, and so on. Today, long after technical 
organs first appeared, this differentiation of the living has led to 
the automatic differentiation of the nonliving, the production of or-
gans and organizations where the difference between organic and 
inorganic becomes blurred in becoming industrial— at the cost of 
an indifferentiation of life (that is, its decline), a loss of biodiversity 
as much as of “cultural diversity.”
At each step of this history of the struggle of negentropy against the 
entropy that results from its becoming technical— and it is perhaps 
precisely this that defines the “pharmacological,” in other words, to 
have, in a Janus- like way, one face that is negentropic and another 
that is entropic— each epoch of life implements new conditions of au-
tomatic repetition in which differences are produced, differences that 
we generally relate to forms of autonomy, of the psukhē defined by 
Aristotle as having three types, and as self- movement in autopoiesis 
in the theory of enaction, and passing through thinking as dialogue 
with oneself according to Plato, or the conquest of majority [Mün-
digkeit] in the Kantian sense (Kant 1991, 54– 60).
But to understand what we are, and to which we will have been 
under way for at least two million years, or four million, if we 
believe Leroi- Gourhan, and to understand it correctly, all this must 
be thought with the concepts of mineral, vital, and psychosocial 
individuation.
Psychosocial individuation is the second epoch of automatism (there 
is no mineral automatism, and this is why Canguilhem can claim 
that there are no mineral monsters: when life reproduces itself, 
it repeats life in an automatic way, but within vital reproduction, 
there can be deviations that we can call monstrous insofar as they 
do not automatically repeat the schema of the organic form that 
is reproducing itself— and this is what cannot happen to a crystal). 
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eventually lead to a generalized industrial automatization founded 
on automation such as it began in the nineteenth century with that 
fact described by Andrew Ure (and cited by Marx 1973, 690– 7122) 
as a “vast automaton.”
A new epoch of psychic and collective individuation thus emerges, 
which would take us into a process that would perhaps not be 
posthuman— because humanism, as the question of knowing what 
humanity is, is not a true question, if it is true that man is the one 
who individuates himself with technics such that he constantly 
becomes other and such that the human adopts the inhuman or 
becomes inhuman as a result of failing to reach the point of human-
ness and from failing to adapt himself by individuating himself, that is, 
from a failure to think and to realize this thought concretely— but 
rather an inversion of exteriorization, where it becomes interiorization 
such that this technical internalization seems to induce a psychic 
disinteriorization.
There is no exteriorization without interiorization— except in the 
case of proletarianization, the precise goal of which is to submit  
the proletarianized to an exteriorization of its knowledge without 
the need for reinternalizing what has been exteriorized. Today 
the evidence of neuroscience opens new vistas in relation to 
these questions. When we see how neuroeconomics “applies” 
this evidence, we can better grasp how significant are the stakes 
of what I believe we should describe as the age of generalized 
automatization.
The hyperindustrial societies that have grown out of the ruins of 
the industrial democracies constitute the third stage of completed 
proletarianization: after the loss of work- knowledge [savoir- faire] 
in the nineteenth century, then of life- knowledge [savoir- vivre] in 
the twentieth, there arises in the twenty- first century the age of the 
loss of theoretical knowledge— as if the cause of our being stunned 
was an absolutely unthinkable becoming.
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theories, those most sublime fruits of idealization and identifi-
cation, are deemed obsolete— and along with them, scientific 
method itself. So at least we are told by Chris Anderson (2008) in 
“The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method 
Obsolete.”3
Founded on the self- production of digital traces, and dominated by 
automatisms that exploit these traces, hyperindustrial societies are 
undergoing the proletarianization of theoretical knowledge, just as 
broadcasting analog traces via television resulted in the proletari-
anization of life- knowledge, and just as the submission of the body 
of the laborer to mechanical traces inscribed in machines resulted 
in the proletarianization of work- knowledge.
Just like written traces, in which Socrates already saw the risk of 
proletarianization contained in any exteriorization of knowledge 
(Stiegler 2010)— the apparent paradox being that knowledge can 
be constituted only through its exteriorization— digital, analog, and 
mechanical traces are what I call tertiary retentions.
Writing (whether ideographic, alphabetic, or digital) is a kind of  
tertiary retention. The brain is the site of secondary retentions, 
which are, in Husserl’s (1991) sense, memories of those percep-
tions that are woven together from what Husserl called “primary 
retentions.”
Retention refers to what is retained, through a mnesic function 
itself constituent of a consciousness, that is, of a psychic apparatus. 
Within this psychic retention, a secondary retention, which is the 
constitutive element of a mental state that is always based on 
memory, was originally a primary retention: by “primary” is meant 
that which is retained in the course of a perception, and through the 
process of this perception, but in the present, which means that pri-
mary retention is not yet a memory, even if it is already a retention. 
A primary retention is what, in the course of a present experience, 
is destined to become a secondary retention of somebody who has 
lived this experience that has become past— secondary because, 
32 no longer being perceived, it is imprinted in the memory of the one 
who had the experience, and from which it may be reactivated.
But a retention, as the result of a flux and emerging from the 
temporal course of experience, may also become tertiary, through 
the spatialization in which consists the grammatization (and more 
generally, in which consists any technical materialization process) 
of the flow of retentions. This mental reality can thus be projected 
onto a support that is neither cerebral nor psychic but rather technical.
When Gilles Deleuze referred to what he called “control societies,” 
he was already heralding the arrival of the hyperindustrial age. The 
destructive capture of attention and desire is what occurs in and 
through those control societies described by Deleuze in terms of 
the noncoercive modulation exercised by television on consumers 
at the end of the twentieth century. These societies of control 
appear at the end of the consumerist epoch, and their effect is to 
make way for the transition to the hyperindustrial epoch.
In the automatic society that Deleuze was never to know, but 
which with Félix Guattari he anticipated (in particular, when they 
referred to dividuals; Deleuze 1995, 180), control passes through 
the mechanical liquidation of discernment, or in Greek, to krinon— 
from krinein, a verb that has the same root as krisis, “decision.” 
The discernment that Kant called “understanding” [Verstand] has 
been automatized as the analytical power delegated to algorithms 
and executed through sensors and actuators but outside of any 
intuition in the Kantian sense, that is, outside any experience (this 
being the situation that occupies the attention of Anderson 2008).
Almost a decade after the collapse of 2008, it is still not clear how 
best to characterize this event: as crisis, mutation, metamorphosis? 
All these terms are metaphors— they are not yet thinking. Krisis, 
which has a long history— in Hippocrates, it refers to a decisive 
turning point in the course of an illness— is also the origin of all 
critique, of all decision exercised by to krinon as the power to judge 
on the basis of criteria. Mutation is understood today primarily 
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refers in everyday life to being transferred to another posting. And 
metamorphosis is a zoological term that comes from the Greek, by 
way of Ovid.
Approaching ten years since this event occurred, it seems that the 
proletarianization of minds and, more precisely, the proletarianiza-
tion of the noetic faculties of theorization, and, in this sense, of scien-
tific, moral, aesthetic, and political deliberation— combined with the 
proletarianization of sensibility and affect in the twentieth century, 
and with the proletarianization of the gestures of the worker in 
the nineteenth century— is both the trigger for and the result of this 
continuing “crisis.” As a result, no decisions are taken, and we fail to 
arrive at any turning point, any “bifurcation” (in Deleuze’s terms). In 
the meantime, all of the toxic aspects that lie at the origins of this 
crisis continue to be consolidated.
When a triggering factor is also an outcome, we find ourselves 
within a spiral. This spiral can be very fruitful and worthwhile, or 
it can enclose us— absent new criteria— in a vicious circle that we 
can then describe as a “downward spiral” that takes us from bad to 
worse.
I believe with Francis Jutand (2013, 9) that the postlarval state in 
which the 2008 crisis has been left implies that we should refer to it 
in terms of metamorphosis rather than mutation: what is going on 
here is not biological, even if biology comes into play via biotech-
nology, and, in certain respects, in an almost proletarianized way.4 
Human evolution is the result of an exosomatic organogenesis, 
as was shown by Alfred J. Lotka (1956) and Nicholas Georgescu- 
Rœgen (1971). In the exosomatic form of life, what drives evolution 
(that is, organogenesis) is not biology but economics— as a process 
of artificial selection for which knowledge is the driver and the 
provider of the criteria of selection.
With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, which is also to say 
of the Anthropocene, exosomatization entered a stage in which 
knowledge was replaced by automation— beginning with the skills 
34 of manual workers. In today’s automated society, all forms of 
knowledge are being short- circuited by systems of digital tertiary 
retention operating four million times more quickly than the 
nervous system of the human noetic body.
Claiming that this is a metamorphosis— which can also be called 
“disruptive innovation”— does not mean that there is no krisis or 
that we need not take account of the critical labor for which it calls. 
It means that this critical labor is precisely what this metamorphosis 
seems to render impossible, thanks precisely to the fact that it 
consists above all in the proletarianization of theoretical knowl-
edge, which is critical knowledge, in a world where today the digital 
reaches speeds of two hundred thousand kilometers per second, 
or two- thirds the speed of light, which is some four million times 
faster than the speed of nerve impulses. It is for this reason that 
I propose understanding the enduring nature of this crisis on the 
basis of the metaphor of the chrysalis, where it becomes a matter 
of how to transform the toxicity of the new exosomatic organs into 
new forms of knowledge.
The stupefying situation in which the current experience of automat-
ic society consists establishes a new mental context (stupefaction) 
within which systemic stupidity undoubtedly proliferates (as func-
tional stupidity, drive- based capitalism, and industrial populism), 
but where this also reflects the rise of a new concern— which, if it is 
not turned into panic, and instead becomes a fertile skepsis, could 
prove to be the beginning of a new understanding of the situation— 
and the genesis of new criteria, or categories: this amounts to the 
question of what I call categorial invention.
Digital technology— which, according to Clarence Herrenschmidt, 
establishes the age of reticular writing— is based on the computer, 
which, more than anything, is an artificial organ of automated 
categorization, that is, it automatically produces digital tertiary 
retentions on the basis of other digital tertiary retentions. The 
automation of categorization makes it possible for operations of 
analysis and understanding to be delegated to digital systems.
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tertiary retentions: on the contrary, it always consists in deciding 
between possibilities opened up by tertiary retentions, but these 
tertiary retentions are not themselves capable of choosing between, 
however automated they may be— for here, to choose means, 
precisely, to disautomatize, that is, to create what Gilles Deleuze 
called a bifurcation.
In Kant, the difference between analysis and synthesis grounds the 
difference between understanding and reason. I have argued that 
analytical understanding is made possible by tertiary retentions 
insofar as they belong to a process of grammatization (such as the 
analysis of a written poem, an analysis made possible by writing), 
grammatization being the discretization, reproduction, and spatial-
ization of temporal flows.
But synthesis too is made possible by analytic tertiary retentions: 
they affect the noetic psychic individual because, spatialized, 
they trace and make public potential conflicts of interpretation— 
pharmacological conflicts between peers that affect these noetic 
individuals. And these affects, the critical convergence of which is 
called reason, are what trigger interpretations. It is from this perspec-
tive that we should read Spinoza.
Through the process of transindividuation, the arbitration of these 
conflicts is “certified.” Certification processes may themselves be either 
analytic or synthetic— and in this case, they are elaborated on the 
basis of interpretations that result in categorial inventions. Herme-
neia is in fact that which, through glosses and commentaries of all 
kinds, invents and generates new categories (whether analytic or 
synthetic) through which knowledge is transformed. New catego-
ries are certified when they are recognized by peers via analytic 
certifications that may on occasion be automated— whereas 
synthetic certifications, which result in categorial inventions that 
provoke bifurcations, can never be delegated to systems, precisely 
because they are processes of interpretation.
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inverting the toxic logic of the pharmakon, would give rise to a new 
hyperindustrial age that would constitute an automatic society founded 
on deproletarianization 5— and which would provide an exit from the 
chrysalis of noetic hymenoptera6— that is, to a society based on the 
valorization of positive externalities and capacities (in Sen’s sense): 
on a contributive economy of pollination (Stiegler 2016).
The proletarianization of the gestures of work amounts to the 
proletarianization of the conditions of the worker’s subsistence.
The proletarianization of sensibility, of sensory life, and the 
proletarianization of social relations, all of which are replaced by 
conditioning, amounts to the proletarianization of the conditions of 
the citizen’s existence.
The proletarianization of minds or spirits, that is, of the noetic 
faculties enabling theorization and deliberation, is the proletari-
anization of the conditions of scientific consistence (including the 
human and social sciences).
In the hyperindustrial stage, hypercontrol is established through 
a process of generalized automatization. This represents a step 
beyond the control- through- modulation discovered and analyzed 
by Deleuze (1995): now, the noetic faculties of theorization and 
deliberation are short- circuited by the current operator of pro-
letarianization, which is digital tertiary retention— just as analog 
tertiary retention was in the twentieth century the operator of 
the proletarianization of life- knowledge, and just as mechanical 
tertiary retention was in the nineteenth century the operator of the 
proletarianization of work- knowledge.
By artificially retaining something through the material and spatial 
copying of a mnesic and temporal element, tertiary retention modi-
fies the relations between the psychic retentions of perception that 
Husserl (1991) referred to as primary retentions and the psychic 
retentions of memory that he called secondary retentions.
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cations of the play between primary retentions and secondary 
retentions, resulting in processes of transindividuation that are each 
time specific, that is, specific epochs of what Simondon called the 
transindividual.
In the course of processes of transindividuation, founded on suc-
cessive epochs of tertiary retention, meanings form that are shared 
by psychic individuals, thereby constituting collective individuals 
themselves forming “societies.” Shared by psychic individuals with-
in collective individuals of all kinds, the meanings formed during 
transindividuation processes constitute the transindividual as an 
ensemble of collective secondary retentions within which collective 
protentions are formed— which are the expectations typical of an 
epoch.
If, according to the Anderson article to which we previously 
referred, so- called Big Data heralds the “end of theory” (Anderson 
2008)— Big Data technology designating what is also called “high- 
performance computing” carried out on massive data sets, where-
by the treatment of data in the form of digital tertiary retentions 
occurs in real time (at the speed of light) and on a global scale and 
at the level of billions of gigabytes of data, operating through data- 
capture systems that are located everywhere around the planet 
and in almost every relational system that a society constitutes— it 
is because digital tertiary retention and the algorithms that allow 
it to be both produced and exploited thereby also make it possible 
for reason as a synthetic faculty to be short- circuited thanks to the 
extremely high speeds at which this automated analytical faculty of 
understanding is capable of operating (Stiegler 2016).
In automatic society, those digital networks referred to as “social” 
networks channel such expressions by submitting them to man-
datory protocols, to which psychic individuals bend because they 
are drawn to do so by the so- called network effect, which, with the 
addition of social networking, becomes an automated herd effect, 
38 that is, a highly mimetic situation. It therefore amounts to a new 
form of artificial crowd in the sense Freud (1955, 124) gave to this 
expression.7
Ten years ago, I compared TV and radio programs and channels to 
the constitution of artificial and conventional crowds such as they 
were analyzed by Freud— for which he gives the examples of army 
and church.
The constitution of groups or crowds and the conditions under 
which they can pass into action were subjects analyzed by Gustave 
Le Bon, cited at length by Freud:
The most striking peculiarity presented by a psychological 
crowd [Masse] is the following. Whoever be the individuals 
that compose it, however like or unlike be their mode 
of life, their occupations, their character, or their intel-
ligence, the fact that they have been transformed into 
a crowd puts them in possession of a sort of collective 
mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner 
quite different from that in which each individual of them 
would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation. 
There are certain ideas and feelings which do not come 
into being, or do not transform themselves into acts ex-
cept in the case of individuals forming a crowd.
The psychological group is a provisional being formed 
of heterogeneous elements, which for a moment are com-
bined, exactly as the cells which constitute a living body 
form by their reunion a new being which displays charac-
teristics very different from those possessed by each of 
the cells singly. (Freud, quoted in Le Bon 1895, 72– 73)8
On the basis of Le Bon’s analyses, Freud showed that there are also 
“artificial” and “conventional” crowds, which he analyzes through 
the examples of the church and the army.
The program industries, too, however, also form, every single day, 
and specifically through the mass broadcast of programs, such 
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precisely to Massenpsychologie), the permanent, everyday mode of 
life in the industrial democracies, which are at the same time what 
I call industrial tele- cracies— wherein the process of identification 
with the leader becomes identification with movie stars and TV 
presenters.
Generated by digital tertiary retention, connected artificial crowds 
constitute the economy of “crowdsourcing,” which should be 
understood in multiple senses— one dimension of which would 
be the so- called cognitariat (Newfield 2010). To a large degree, 
Big Data is utilized by technologies that exploit the potential of 
crowdsourcing in its many forms, engineered by social networking 
and data science.
Through the network effect, through the artificial crowds that 
create (more than a billion psychic individuals on Facebook), and 
through the crowdsourcing that it can exploit through Big Data, it 
is possible
• to generate the production and autocapture by individuals of 
those tertiary retentions that are “personal data,” spatializ-
ing their psychosocial temporalities;
• to intervene in the processes of transindividuation that are 
woven between them by utilizing these “personal data” at 
the speed of light via circuits that are formed automatical-
ly and performatively;
• through these circuits, and through the collective second-
ary retentions that they form automatically, and no longer 
transindividually, to intervene in return, almost immediately, 
on psychic secondary retentions, which is also to say, on 
protentions, expectations, and, ultimately, personal 
behavior: it thus becomes possible to remotely control, 
one by one, the members of a network— this is so- called 
personalization.
The internet is a pharmakon that can thus become a technique 
for hypercontrol and social dis- integration. Without a new politics 
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toward the specific tertiary retentions that make possible the new 
technical milieu, it will inevitably become an agent of dissociation.
The pharmacological character of the digital age has become more 
or less clear to those who belong to it, resulting in what I am calling 
“net blues”: the state of fact constituted by this new age of tertiary 
retention has failed to provide a new state of law. On the contrary, 
it has liquidated the rule of law as produced by the retentional 
systems of the bygone epoch. Property law, for example, has been 
directly challenged by activists through their practices in relation to 
free software, and through reflecting on the “commons,” including 
some young artists who are attempting to devise a new economic 
and political framework for their thinking.
These questions must, however, be seen as elements of an 
epistemic and epistemological transition from fact to law, a tran-
sition effected by referring canonically to apodictic experience— 
projecting law beyond fact. The passage from fact to law is first a 
matter of discovering in facts the necessity of interpreting them, that 
is, of projecting beyond the facts themselves, but also on the basis of 
facts that are not themselves self- sufficient— projecting them onto 
another plane toward which they beckon: that of a consistence 
through which and in which we must “believe.”
This other plane is that of negentropy. If we are now living in the 
Anthropocene, this state of fact is not sustainable: we must pass 
to a state of law in which negentropy becomes the criteria of every 
type of value, the value of value, and this is why we must enter 
into the Neganthropocene. This requires a neganthropology, that 
is, an economy of the pharmakon that is produced by the process 
of exosomatization, where the exosomatic organs are always both 
entropic and negentropic and where no biological law prescribes 
their arrangements.
In such a neganthropological situation, belief means the ability 
to project possibilities for bifurcation, in a system that is on the 
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system cannot calculate. Such possibilities are those prescribed 
and certified by work- knowledge, life- knowledge, and conceptual 
knowledge, that is, by knowledge of how to live, do, and think.
Automatization is bringing with it a massive macroeconomic prob-
lem: the decline in purchasing power that results from rising unem-
ployment. This situation requires new criteria for the redistribution 
of productivity gains. And we believe— at Ars Industrialis, and at 
the Institut de recherche et d’innovation, as we together develop 
a ten- year experiment with a region in the north of Paris, Plaine 
Commune9— that a genuinely contributory economy must be an 
economy of neganthropy based on a contributory income. This 
must be a conditional income that allows individuals to be paid to 
increase their capabilities, on the condition that they contribute 
to any kind of “neganthropic” enterprise, as has been the case in 
France for those working in the performing arts and the cinema.
This is so because in France, there is a scheme that indemnifies 
against unemployment those workers known as intermittents du 
spectacle. This scheme should become a model for a law of work in 
an economy of contribution, just as we believe that free software, 
inasmuch as it is a challenge to the industrial division of labor, should 
constitute a model for the organization of work. The widespread 
generalization of this organization of work requires a contributory 
organology that remains entirely to be developed10— in the first 
place, with the free software communities that have been around 
now for thirty years.
The scheme covering these occasional workers is even older: it 
was established in 1936 and has since been much transformed. It 
was threatened for the first time in 2003 and became the object 
of a struggle, in relation to which Antonella Corsani and Maurizio 
Lazzarato wrote in 2008,
It is in reality a struggle whose stakes are the employ-
ment of time. To the injunction to increase the time of 
employment, that is, the proportion of life occupied by 
42 employment, the experience of intermittence opposes the 
multiplicity of the times of employment. (121)
In other words, the intermittence scheme completely rearranges 
employment and time, precisely by considering the work of the 
“intermittent” as time outside employment— as capacitation and 
individuation and hence as much more than just earnings and 
production. Corsani and Lazzarato therefore conclude that we 
must “interrogate the very category of ‘work’”:
If there is activity during periods of unemployment, but 
also during the time of so- called living, during the time 
called free, during the time of training, until it flows over 
into the time for rest, what then does work encompass, 
given that it contains a multiplicity of activities and het-
erogeneous temporalities? (121)
Amartya Sen (2000, xii) relates “capacitation” and “capability” to 
the development of freedom, which is to say, in the first place, 
free time, which he defines as always being both individual and 
collective:
We have to see individual freedom as a social 
commitment.
In this way, Sen remains faithful to both Kantian and Socratic per-
spectives. Capability constitutes the basis of economic dynamism 
and development, and it does so as freedom:
Expansion of freedom is viewed, in this approach, 
both as the primary end and as the principal means of 
development. (36)
Freedom, in Sen’s definition, is therefore a form of agency: the 
power to act.
Sen’s comparative example of the incapacitating effects of consum-
erism (that is, in his terms, of the indicators of affluence) is well 
known: the black residents of Harlem have a lower life expectancy 
43than the people of Bangladesh, and this is precisely a question of 
their “agency.”
Freedom is here a question of knowledge insofar as it is a capability 
that is always both individual and collective— and this means individ-
uated both psychically and collectively. It was on this basis that Sen 
devised the Human Development Index to form a contrast with the 
Economic Growth Index.
I would like to extend Sen’s propositions by means of a different 
analysis, one that leads to other questions. In particular, consid-
eration must be given to the question of what relations psychic 
and collective individuals can forge with automatons, in order to 
achieve individual and collective bifurcations within an industrial 
and economic system that, having become massively automatized, 
tends also to become closed.
The Anthropocene, insofar as it is an “Entropocene,” amounts to 
accomplished nihilism: it produces an unsustainable leveling of all 
values that requires a leap into a “transvaluation” capable of giving 
rise to a “general economy” in Georges Bataille’s (1988) sense, 
whose work I have elsewhere tried to show involves a reconsider-
ation of libidinal economy. The movement I am describing here is 
no doubt not a transvaluation in a strict Nietzschean sense. Rather, 
it is an invitation to reread Nietzsche with respect to questions of 
disorder and order, that is, also, entropy and negentropy, that in 
the following will be understood in terms of becoming and future.
If there is to be a future, and not just a becoming, the value of 
tomorrow will lie in the constitutive negentropy of the economy- to- 
come of the Neganthropocene. For such an economy, the practical 
and functional differentiation between becoming and future must 
form its criteria of evaluation— only in so doing will it be possible 
to overcome the systemic entropy in which the Anthropocene 
consists. This economy requires a shift from anthropology to 
neganthropology, where the latter is founded on what I call general 
44 organology and on a pharmacology: the pharmakon, that is, 
technics in general as both poison and remedy, is the artifact and 
as such the condition of hominization, that is, an organogenesis of 
artifactual organs and organizations, but it always produces both 
entropy and negentropy, and hence it is always also a threat to 
hominization.
The problem raised by such a perspective on the future is to know 
how to evaluate or measure negentropy. Referred to as negative 
entropy by Erwin Schrödinger and as anti- entropy by Francis Bailly 
and Giuseppe Longo, negentropy is always defined in relation to 
an observer (see the work of Atlan 1979; Morin 1992)— that is, it is 
always described in relation to a locality in time as well as in space 
that it, as such, produces, and that it differentiates within a more or 
less homogeneous space (and this is why a neganthropology is 
always also a geography). What appears entropic from one angle is 
negentropic from another angle.
Knowledge, as work- knowledge (that is, knowledge of what to 
do so that I do not myself collapse and am not led into chaos), as 
life- knowledge (that is, knowledge that enriches and individuates 
the social organization in which I live without destroying it), and as 
conceptual knowledge (that is, knowledge the inheritance of which 
occurs only by passing through its transformation, and which is 
transformed only by being reactivated through a process of what 
Socrates called anamnesis [Plato 1961], a process that, in the West, 
structurally exceeds its locality)— knowledge, in all these forms, is 
always a way of collectively defining what is negentropic in this or that 
field of human existence.
What we call the inhuman is a denial of the negentropic possibilities 
of the human, that is, a denial of its noetic freedom and, as a result, 
its agency. What Sen describes as freedom and capability must 
be conceived from this cosmic perspective and related to Alfred 
Whitehead’s “speculative cosmology” as constituting a negentropic 
potentiality— as the potential for openness of a localized system 
that, for that being we refer to as “human,” may always once again 
45become closed. Or, in Whitehead’s (1929, 18– 19) terms, human 
beings may always relapse, decay into simpler forms, that is, 
become inhuman.
Today, in the Anthropocene, which with total automation is 
reaching a threshold of disruptiveness, the context of the task of 
thinking conceived as therapeutics is one in which automatisms 
of all kinds are being technologically integrated by digital autom-
atisms. The unique and very specific aspect of this situation is the 
way that digital tertiary retention succeeds in totally rearranging 
the assemblages or montages of psychic and collective retentions 
and protentions. The challenge is to invert this situation by having 
an ars of hypercontrol instead reach toward a new idea of work as 
disautomatization, which would arise out of today’s dis- integrating 
automatization.
Translated by Daniel Ross
Notes
 1 Stupefaction, which is not merely stupidity, but which is in general its cause, is 
the typical modality of our age, insofar as it is the age of disruptive innovation 
in the epoch of what, already in 1996, I referred to as disorientation (Stiegler 
2009).
 2 This is the so- called Fragment on Machines.
 3 I argued in What Makes Life Worth Living (Stiegler 2013) that Alan Greenspan’s 
defense when confronted with the failure of the financial system was already 
based on the argument that in an automated financial economy, it is no longer 
possible to theorize, and that from this, it followed that he had no responsi-
bility to act after the series of economic catastrophes that were caused by the 
dogmas that he applied during the subprime era, from making Madoff chair-
man of NASDAQ to the decision not to rescue Lehman Brothers.
 4 On this topic, see Stiegler (2013, chapter 7).
 5 This refers to the possibility of deproletarianization through the socialization of 
factors that produce proletarianization and is the hypothesis that governs the 
new critique of political economy advocated by Ars Industrialis.
 6 See the French Wikipedia entry on “hymenoptera”: “The order hymenoptera 
includes herbivores, pollinators, and a wide range of entomophagous insects 
that play a central role in maintaining natural equilibrium. The entomophagous 
insects comprise the majority of parasitoids (43% of hymenoptera species that 
have been described) but also predators. The actual number of hymenoptera 
is estimated at somewhere between one and three million species, divided 
46 into a hundred families. Many species have not yet been described, or even 
discovered.”
 7 Translation modified.
 8 Translation modified.
 9 See http://recherchecontributive.org/.
10 This will be the theme of the final chapter of Bernard Stiegler, Automatic Society, 
Volume 2: The Future of Knowledge. Concerning concepts derived from computer 
science, see Hui (2016).
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The	Ecosystem	Is	
an	Apparatus:	From	
Machinic	Ecology	to	the	
Politics	of	Resilience
Thomas Pringle
More than ever today, nature has become inseparable from culture; 
and if we are to understand the interactions between ecosystems, the 
mechanosphere, and the social and individual universes of reference, 
we have to learn to think “transversally.” As the waters of Venice are 
invaded by monstrous, mutant algae, so our television screens are 
peopled and saturated by “degenerate” images and utterances. In the 
realm of social ecology, Donald Trump and his ilk— another form of 
algae— are permitted to proliferate unchecked. In the name of reno-
vation, Trump takes over whole districts of New York or Atlantic City, 
raises rents, and squeezes out tens of thousands of poor families. 
Those who Trump condemns to homelessness are the social equiva-
lent of the dead fish of environmental ecology.
— Félix Guattari, The Three Ecologies
Animate	|	Automate:	Machine	Components	
for	Current	Technopolitical	Thought
Animate derives from the Latin animatus, in the sense of “giving life 
to.” Automate, from automation, originates in the Greek automatos, 
the “acting of itself.” For Gertrud Koch and Bernard Stiegler, these 
terms of media provide a lens through which to conceive machines 
50 as philosophical configurations of culture, technology, aesthetics, 
and labor.
Both animate and automate illustrate how “Machine” works as a 
theoretical concept and help differentiate “Machine” as a term 
of media from “Technology.” Machine, from the Greek Mākhanā́, 
denotes a tool, and derivations variously indicate means or 
strategies (machinations), abilities, instruments of power, or tricks. 
While technology implements scientific knowledge, machines 
are specifically tied to labor, work, and power. Animation, from 
one perspective, concerns the ontology of the machine and the 
manner by which machines bring matter to life. More precisely, 
animation describes the machine in its capacity to set matter into 
movement, whether through mechanism or illusion. Automation, 
from another perspective, focuses on the machine’s technical 
procedure, repetition, and dispersal in time. Machines change au-
tomatically, whether through formal differentiation, deterioration, 
reproduction, or self- replication. While these terms are distinct 
characterizations of the functionality of machines, the animation 
of life and the repetitive automation of production are not entirely 
distinct, as illustrated by Stiegler (2015, 16) in a recent interview, in 
which he explains that the operative properties of machines and 
life are functionally analogous: “Life is automatic. A Biological cell, 
for example, is a sequence of instructions and this sequence of 
instructions is automatic. The reproduction of life is automatic. . . . 
So automatic repetition is really the basis of life.” What is the work 
of animate and automate as each term purports to describe in 
technical terms the operation of an inhuman process, be it organic 
or technological? What supports the analogous description of 
organic and technical development? Given the proximity of the 
animating and automating functions of the machine— whether 
that is illusion, labor, work, production, reproduction, or self- 
replication— the machine’s privileged status as a site of conceptual 
translation between those vital mechanisms that bring- to- life, and 
the mechanical codes that drive repetition, mark this volume’s field 
of theoretical inquiry.
51Between animate and automate, the concept of the machine 
answers questions about contemporary media technologies 
that operate across both great and microscopic scales. When 
perceived from within a digital paradigm that understands people, 
nature, and infrastructure in the calculable rubric of information, 
the magnitude of machines and their mass dispersal becomes 
a political problem. We get close to machines. Through use, we 
develop intimate, habitual, and embodied relations with complex 
machinery and take in the knowledge of the world that they relay. 
Machines have grown to span continents, like electrical grids, 
but the digital turn arguably extends the purview of machines 
to the scale of smart cities, undersea cable networks, or satellite 
communication systems. Then, we debate the consequences of the 
embodied sensibilities opened by the knowledge– infrastructure 
couplings inherent to encounters with machines too large or famil-
iar to see, much less operate on our own. Machines, by magnitude, 
complexity, availability, or mass production, are inherently social 
devices. They never leave us alone.
Koch, in “Animation of the Technical and the Quest for Beauty” 
(chapter 1 of this volume), frames and reframes the human body, 
and the machine’s animation of the human’s perceptive faculties, 
against a technoecological drama. Situating the labor, beauty, and 
practicality of machines within broader patterns of social organi-
zation guiding the human use of technology, “machines” become 
“agents in a field of techniques.” Her theory departs from tradi-
tions of media ecology initiated by Marshall McLuhan— wherein 
technological mediums are extensions of the body’s form— by 
sharpening the function of illusion and fetish in the animating pur-
pose of the machine. This move accords to a “paradigm change: 
[when] machines are no longer extensions of organs” but “media 
that performatively intervene in our action.” Alternatively, Stiegler 
prepares readers “For a Neganthropology of Automatic Society” 
(chapter 2 of this volume) by raising automation as a concept 
illustrating the repetitive production of proletarian knowledge 
that he distills as the characteristic of work in digital network 
52 culture. Referencing Chris Anderson’s proclamation that Big Data’s 
processes of automatic calculation render the scientific method 
obsolete, Stiegler cautions that the production of theoretical 
knowledge itself is lost to the automation of human thought as it is 
reticulated within the speed and form of automated machines and 
their retentive functionality for autonomous computation. Hence, 
“in today’s automated society, all forms of knowledge are being 
short- circuited by systems of digital tertiary retention operating 
four million times more quickly than the nervous system of the 
human noetic body.” Koch and Stiegler locate the machine— in 
its animating and automating capacities— as a primary object for 
critique in a social environment that is as much technological as it 
is natural.
With these two functions of the machine in mind— the animation 
of life and the automation of production— I see the ecosystem as a 
term of media that helps articulate the machine’s particular concep-
tual value. The ecosystem is a variety of machine that, like animate 
and automate, easily slips between operative functions found in 
both the technical and the organic. As a hybrid term melding the 
study of the environmental– organic flows of biophysical reality 
(ecology) and the mechanisms of networked cohesion (system), eco-
system offers a way to theorize how machines mimic the animate 
and productive forces of life, while accounting for the automatic 
conversion of natural resources into energy, commodities, and 
waste through repetition and self- regulation. Ecosystem, as I outline 
later, is a unique term of media that holds a strategically valuable 
historical relationship to proximate concepts, including economy, 
the psyche, apparatus, and digital information. Exploring these 
relationships provides a way to synthesize the animate qualities of 
life’s cascade— ecology— with the automated patterns of production 
both defining energy flow in nature and giving the capacity for 
modes of work in the economy. The ecosystem, I argue, is also a 
term of media, advantageously positioned as a machine that maps 
the recursive traffic between animate and automate, ecological and 
economic systems.
53Machines	between	Ecology	and	Economy
What does analyzing text, or media, as a part of an “ecology” actu-
ally mean?1 Does enlisting the term ecology for critical inquiry easily 
assume an immanent relationship between systems of discourse 
and the field of nondiscursive actions that constitute the interac-
tivity of both technological and biophysical reality? How does the 
history of the science of ecology— the study of the flow of natural 
systems— influence the reception of the ecosystem as the term 
becomes a critical method in the humanities?
The epistemology outlined by cyberneticist Gregory Bateson (1972) 
in Steps to an Ecology of Mind is exemplary of an ecological method-
ology, with one of the book’s direct influences in social and political 
theory being Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s ([1980] 1987) A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. The marriage of 
Bateson’s concepts with an explicit environmental political program 
is expressed most clearly in Guattari’s (1989) later work The Three 
Ecologies. Guattari’s thesis, quoted in the epigraph, forwards an 
imperative to think transversally across the delineated bounds 
of discursive systems of knowledge, biophysical systems, and 
systems of technological autonomy. It is in thirty- year retrospect 
that The Three Ecologies appears to reach the status of theoretical 
clairvoyance, as Guattari’s employment of a general ecological 
method forecasts the political rise of Donald Trump. For Guattari, 
the right- wing politician is recast as a form of mutant algae virally 
invading and expanding amid the posttruth social, technical, and 
material ecologies of late capitalism.
In looking to the Bateson quote that Guattari selected to open The 
Three Ecologies, an ecology of mind is described as a proscriptive 
method, which, given how American political history has played out 
since, could also be described as prophylactic: “There is an ecology 
of bad ideas, just as there is an ecology of weeds” (Bateson, as 
quoted in Guattari 1989, 131). Guattari’s argument outlines how 
to critically diagnose the emergent destructive norms of capital-
ism’s fixation on growth and overtaxation of the environment as 
54 toxic interactions by assuming a philosophical topology linking 
nature, culture, and technology: “The new ecological praxes,” for 
Guattari, “articulate themselves across the whole range of these 
interconnected and heterogeneous fronts” (139). Ecological science 
is principally about mapping the interconnection of heterogeneous 
relations between the bounded systems of physical environments 
and organisms. Ecology, as a generalized critical method offered by 
Guattari following Bateson, instead recognizes how webs of subjec-
tive human thought and technological automation equally function 
according to models of cascade, succession, bioaccumulation, or 
the invasion of neighboring communities.
One critical difference lies in how Guattari (1989, 131) locates 
human thought and its social valence— which doesn’t take the form 
of “subjects” but of “components of subjectification”— as just one 
interconnecting “ecology” that crosses and interacts with the two 
other ecological enclosures: the biophysical environment and the 
mechanical coevolution of technological forms. For the sake of 
comparison, the methodology of systemic discourse analysis would 
be a shallow version of what Guattari has in mind, as discourse 
privileges only the first ecology— the networked epistemology of 
minds in their individual and collective linguistic registers— while 
devaluing the composite influences of the latter two ecologies: 
operational effects between, and originating within, both the 
surrounding material environment and the ongoing phylogeny of 
machines.
The Three Ecologies posits a political theory for a world with increas-
ingly visible environmental crises precipitated by the unchecked 
growth of capitalist economies, the widespread distribution of 
increasingly powerful technologies— like nuclear power— prone to 
novel geographical and temporal scales of ecological catastrophe, 
and those social algal blooms that seek to virally overpower com-
petition to secure scarce resources. “We need to apprehend the 
world through the interchangeable lenses of the three ecologies,” 
Guattari (1989, 134) writes,
55for there are limits— as Chernobyl and AIDS have sav-
agely demonstrated— to the technico- scientific power 
of humanity. Nature kicks back. If we are to orient the 
sciences and technology toward more human goals, we 
clearly need collective management and control— not blind 
reliance on technocrats in the state apparatuses, in the 
hope they will control developments and minimize risks in 
fields largely dominated by the pursuit of profit. (empha-
sis added)
It’s worth emphasizing that for Guattari, notwithstanding his 
attempt to push political analysis past human language and 
cognition, the human subject is primarily the emancipatory actor. 
The goal of thinking across the The Three Ecologies involves the 
“re- evaluat[ion] [of] the ultimate goal of work and human activities 
in terms of criteria other than those of profit and productivity” 
(Guattari 1989, 142) as the principal political vector for cultivating 
sustainability across each ecological realm of analysis (semiotic, 
biophysical, technological). Eschewing liberal individualism, Guat-
tari’s ecological politics advocate, in his terms, collective manage-
ment and collective control— a vision akin to a socially radical and 
transversal permaculture.
As demonstrated herein, Guattari specifically pivots on these 
cybernetically inflected terms— management and control— in what 
I see as a resigned acceptance of the ineluctability of the historical 
concepts, and the corresponding institutional apparatuses, made 
available by information theory, its cybernetic circulation, and 
technological application. With such advocacy for collectivity, it is 
individual faith in the technocratic and economic state adminis-
tration of ecology under the superordinate guidance of profit and 
productivity that proves the problem to be overcome by transver-
sal reasoning across The Three Ecologies. Restated, environmental 
politics become, How to think transversally about the reticulation 
of the individual within the natural, technological, and social col-
lective? How can collective control and management be achieved 
56 apart from the overarching coordinate objectives of profit and 
streamlined productivity?
This chapter pauses on the notion of information as it shaped the 
concept of the ecosystem in postwar ecology. I trace the recursive 
history of the ecosystem as the idea originates in theories describ-
ing the mind as a system and subsequently becomes the dominant 
concept for describing biophysical reality as a cybernetic hybrid of 
nature and machine, otherwise, as an amalgamation of technologi-
cal and ecological systems.2 The informational paradigm authorizes 
Guattari’s proposal for an intersystemic analysis of exchanges 
between mind, biophysical reality, and technology. Information 
supports a common theoretical ground for strategic conceptual flu-
idity between fields of study, as epitomized by the postwar appeal 
by the cybernetic technosciences to become a “universal discipline” 
through rhetorical strategies of “legitimacy exchange” (Bowker 
1993, 116). This alleged universality between bounded disciplines 
is the epistemological conceit mimicked and exploited by Guattari 
in The Three Ecologies. Transversality is the revaluation of ecology 
as unnatural and technoecological, otherwise, as the acceptance of 
the total fusion of organism and machine conjured by the idealized 
image of the cybernetic ecosystem. Guattari amends the ecosys-
tem with an elevated aim of political transformation as articulated 
from within a critical position assuming the systemic interactions 
of individual and collective psyche, natural processes, and the 
adjacent lives of machines: “The general ecology,” as Erich Hörl 
(2013, 128) succinctly notes, “is an ecology of a natural– technical 
continuum.”
I characterize Guattari’s move to study the transversality between 
ecologies as an immanent critique that transgresses the enclosed 
epistemic boundaries of existing systems and disciplines. This 
move is reluctant insofar as Guattari recognizes that the infor-
mational paradigm that makes available and supports such a 
theoretical move equally enables the antipolitical formations that 
he argues against. This is evidenced by the ability for bad ideas to 
proliferate in technonatural media ecologies in a weedlike manner, 
57as the perceived negative qualities of weeds follows a historical 
argument as opposed to an evolutionary one. Rhetorically, then, 
cybernetic universalism is recognized as ineluctable: as axiom, 
provocation, target, and tool. Guattari’s critique confronts a system 
with systemic reason, which, as I describe throughout this chapter, 
is a recapitulation of the recursive problem that defines the politics 
of the ecosystem. Specifically, this chapter hones the efficacy of the 
ecosystem as a political term of media by highlighting the work the 
term does beyond its hybrid technonatural metaphorical status. 
Instead, the ecosystem is a mechanism that translates knowledge 
between two fields caught in the twentieth century’s cybernetic 
fold: ecology and economy. This is most evident in the turn to eco-
logical resilience- thinking in recent American environmental and 
military policy, as the convenient historical affinity found between 
ecology and economy under the aegis of the ecosystem is argued 
to rationalize the entrenched relationship between national secu-
rity and resource extraction in a form of governance focused on 
tactical response to unpredictable, yet impending, ecological crisis.
Guattari (1989, 135) prophesized that in a media- informational 
environment, such as ours, politicians like “Donald Trump and 
his ilk— another form of algae— are permitted to proliferate 
unchecked.” Despite the apparent prescience of this statement, 
I don’t see value in reading Guattari’s text for a preemptive and 
transversal explanation of the social support in Trump’s 2016 
election. Instead, I take another route and suggest that, accord-
ing to the historical calibration of thought encapsulated by the 
ecosystem’s strategic management of intellectual traffic between 
environmental, technological, and economic modes of organiza-
tion, Guattari’s text opens a theoretical path to understanding 
the Trump administration’s environmental program as a strategy 
of governance dependent on the continuation of ecological crisis 
conditions. If Guattari highlights the challenge to thought posed 
by modern ecological crises that are anthropogenically economic 
and technological in origin, the list of “neoliberal catastrophes” that 
Nicole Shukin (2016) identifies as that “to which we are becoming 
58 accustomed: Fukushima, Deepwater Horizon, Chernobyl, Exxon 
Valdez, Bhopal, and so on,” look to provide an ideal habitat for the 
“unchecked proliferation” of the Trump administration’s mutated 
conservatism, which manifests in twinned environmental policies 
of ecological and economic resilience.
The following series of events appears heterogeneous but is, I 
maintain, identifiable as a part of the broader and unified ecosys-
temic governance embracing resilience planning:
On June 6, 2016, President Trump suggested the addi-
tion of solar panels to greenwash and help finance the 
construction of the American border wall with Mexico, 
dovetailing xenophobia with sustainable energy invest-
ment and the Pentagon’s strategic futurological work 
to forecast climate refugees from Mexico and Central 
America (Parenti 2011; Garfield 2017). In 2018, Interior 
Secretary Ryan Zinke launched a complementary initiative 
by retasking National Park Service officers to patrol the 
United States– Mexico border, citing migration as an “envi-
ronmental disaster” (Green, 2018).
On September 13, 2017, President Trump proposed cor-
porate tax cuts via Twitter as the American humanitarian 
policy par excellence for hurricane- ravaged Puerto Rico 
(Klein 2017).
On November 2, 2017, the Republican Party passed the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, permitting Alaskan National Wild-
life Refuge land sales to oil and natural gas companies. 
As a part of a broader policy move transforming environ-
mentally protected reserves into financially active nat-
ural resource reserves, the inclusion of extreme energy 
extraction confirms the speculative efforts advanced by 
petrochemical corporations toward previously inaccessi-
ble arctic oil, which is made increasingly available by con-
ditions consistent with climate change. This act is a clear 
move to secure and securitize a future when thawed ice 
59means both more drilling and less foreign energy depen-
dence (Meiklejohn 2017; Hiltzik 2017; Jerving et al. 2015; 
Lieberman and Rust 2015).
On February 12, 2018, President Trump’s budget request 
gestured toward realizing his campaign promise of an 
American coal and nuclear renaissance. The marriage 
of proposed coal and atomic energy growth confirms 
an underrecognized alliance between revitalized invest-
ment in fossil fuel extraction, national security interest in 
stockpiled materials for nuclear weapons and petroleum 
for the military– industrial complex, and the continued 
endorsement of a nuclear power transition as lauded by 
neoliberal scientists, all while cutting renewable energy 
initiatives (Cooper 2008, 42; Natter 2017; Gardner 2018).
Geoengineering is increasingly disseminated as “a techno- 
utopian deus ex machina,” but the idea originates in neo-
conservative think tanks already working to cast doubt 
on climate change, as Philip Mirowski argues that manu-
factured ignorance itself is a stopgap measure intended 
to preserve free market autonomy and economic growth 
against ecological imperatives to the contrary (Mirowski, 
Walker, and Abboud 2013; Mirowski 2013).
When considered through the following discussion, each of these 
cynical prospects gains theoretical clarity with reference to the 
history and mechanism of the ecosystem: resilience, otherwise, 
how the state and economy adjust toward maintaining systemic 
multidynamic cohesive stability by increasing financial gain and 
enhancing national security upon encountering the uncertain, yet 
imminent, destabilization promised by environmental threats.
Guattari was right: nature has become inseparable from culture, 
but this critical observation is equally legible to those who would 
exploit the entanglement. As the spokesperson for the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency summed up the destructive 
2017 hurricane season in the United States, “the only way we 
60 become resilient as a nation is we have to create the true culture of 
preparedness among our citizenry” (Green 2017, emphasis added). 
As I conclude, cultures of resilience demonstrate why it is a mistake 
to think that the choreographed dance between neoliberal and 
neoconservative policies that specify the administration of envi-
ronmental politics in the United States is a mode of governance 
ignorant to the imbrication of nature, culture, and technology.
Seeing environmental politics along Guattari’s ecological topology, 
Matteo Pasquinelli (2017) works to expand the programmatic of 
“machinic ecology” to fully describe the historical cleavage of labor 
into energy (systemic material exchange) and information (ener-
getic control). This series of bifurcations is part of an emerging 
environmental– governmental strategy that corresponds to three 
stages of capitalism and their complementary extractive machines. 
An “epistemic rift” forms “between energy and information that was 
provoked by industrial capitalism [the factory] and then amplified 
by cybernetics [ergonomic control society] and the digital revolu-
tion [planetary computation]” (312– 13). He argues that the initial 
bifurcation was enacted during the onset of industrial capitalism by 
technologically organizing the productive force of labor into the ex-
traction of natural resources, like coal (labor- become- energy), while 
the pedagogy of workers in the factory functioned as energetic 
control (information), as workers could then make use of the mined 
resources and autonomously operate extractive machines. For 
Pasquinelli (2017, 313), the large- scale machines of capitalism are 
diagrams describing how labor is breached into the historical ab-
stractions of energy, or “labor as manual activity,” and information, 
or “labor as a source of information that gives form to energy and 
matter.” This “epistemic rift” replaces John Bellamy Foster’s concept 
of “metabolic rift” recuperated from Karl Marx’s study of the 
ecological fissure grown between humans as occupants of cities in 
industrial society and the natural soil conditions increasingly deplet-
ed by commercial agriculture and the accumulation of resources in 
large population centers (Foster 1999). Pasquinelli, instead, offers 
Guattari’s “machinic ecology” as a method to diagnose the trans-
61actions of “empirical assemblages” that link both nature and society 
through the organized severance of labor into the abstractions of 
energy and information, as opposed to the traditional Marxian 
description of nature– society relations as rifting.
Pasquinelli proposes the “machinic [a]s indebted to the open 
framework inaugurated by cybernetics that aimed to dissolve 
the border between organic systems and technical systems” 
(324). Then, his advocacy of machinic ecology follows Guattari by 
employing the same informational paradigm that grounds both 
the potential and the problematic of the system, as the machinic 
rhetorically and strategically employs the openness of cybernetic 
universality to illuminate: “a mode of governance that attempts to 
dissolve labor conflicts into the fabric of information and energy, 
thus mystifying labor into technological forms so as to render it 
invisible” (313). As demonstrated in this chapter, the conceptual 
development of the ecosystem is central to the mode of gover-
nance implied by Pasquinelli, even, perhaps, going so far as to 
preempt and disarm Pasquinelli’s ultimate recommendation that “it 
may be better to try and consolidate the assemblage of energy and 
information into new systemic notions” (321).
 Then, machinic ecology highlights the abstraction processes defin-
ing three stages of capitalist economic history (industrial, cybernet-
ic, digital) alongside their corresponding machines, technologies, 
and institutions (factory, ergonomic control, computation) that give 
informational form to the matter produced by the energy of labor 
(312– 13). As I compile here, there is an emerging set of political 
strategies centered on the ecosystem that follow the epistemic 
rift between energy and information by grounding conceptual 
exchanges between ecology and economy. Most dangerously, 
following Melinda Cooper and Jeremy Walker’s (2012) genealogy 
of resilience, this mode of ecosystemic governance is positioned to 
gain from uncertain environmental conditions that are temporally 
and statistically inbound as future ecological crises precipitated by 
capitalist organization in the present.
62 What	Is	an	Ecosystem?
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the concept of the ecosystem has a curious 
relationship to theories of the mind. As Laura Cameron recounts, 
British ecologist Arthur George Tansley’s (1935)  introduction of 
the term in the famous paper “The Use and Abuse of Vegetational 
Concepts and Terms” is partially indebted to his time undergoing 
psychoanalytic treatment with Sigmund Freud, twelve years previ-
ously. Tansley remained fascinated with Freud’s theory and prac-
tice throughout his career, even laying out his own theory of mind 
in resemblance of his concept of the ecosystem: an “interwoven 
plexus of moving material . . . a more or less ordered system, or 
rather a system of systems . . . acting and reacting” (Tansley, quot-
ed in Cameron 2004, 56). Cameron highlights how Tansley’s original 
ecosystem aimed toward equilibrium asymptotically, similarly to 
Freud’s theory of the psyche, which reveals the early ecosystem 
theory to be both an idealized model limited in application and a 
theory founded in relation to a constitutive negativity retaining an 
absence beyond the enclosure of the model.
Tansley’s introduction of the term, and its logical proximity to con-
temporaneous theories of mind, is important for several reasons. 
As Cameron and Earley (2015, 479, 475) write, quoting Tansley, the 
ecosystem originally included the agency of human beings as the 
“most powerful biotic factor” under the banner of “anthropogenic 
ecosystems [which] differ from those developed independently of 
man.” The early recognition and inclusion of human activity within 
scientific models of biophysical reality is crucial to environmental 
history because the term was later evacuated of this conceptual 
qualification in an explicit political application of the theory 
toward imperial ends during the Conservancy movement, which 
legitimated ecologists’ role as “nature’s managers” (Cameron and 
Earley 2015, 476) over an allegedly “de- peopled” wilderness. In this 
sense, the anthropocentric frame to the ecosystem— its recursive 
modeling of mind, agency, and nature— was repressed, as was 
Tansley’s insistence, following Freud, that ecosystems strive toward 
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was founded as a transversal object (physical system, mental, and 
environmental) in recursive epistemological relation to negativity.
Like many human and social sciences in the postwar period, 
ecology was an inheritor of the cybernetic program delineating 
the control exerted by information over energetic exchanges 
between humans, animals, and machines. In 1948, Yale ecologist 
G. Evelyn Hutchinson’s interest in thinking together ecology and 
thermodynamic systems would unite Russian biogeochemist V. I. 
Vernadsky’s approach to the “Biosphere,” as a physical thermody-
namic system composed of interacting living and inert matter, with 
Tansley’s ecosystem through the introduction of the calculation 
of information as the control mechanism for the flow of energy in 
natural systems. After attending the interdisciplinary and influential 
Macy Conferences on cybernetics in 1948, following an invitation 
from Bateson, Hutchinson drew the “concept of circular causality 
as a means for describing the mechanisms by which ecological sys-
tems regulate themselves” (Bryant 2006, 66– 67). In 1953, Eugene 
Odum synthesized these ideas into Fundamentals of Ecology by 
focusing and articulating a cybernetic ecosystem as a central model 
for theorizing nature as informational systems. Citing the influence 
of his brother Howard, who was a student of Hutchinson, the 
Odums’s cybernetic ecology “swiftly became a dominant paradigm 
within the science, reaching its zenith with the International Biologi-
cal Program in the late 1960s and early 1970s” (Bryant 2006, 71).
With the support of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Odums 
first worked to apply their concept of an ecosystem ecology in the 
1950s by studying the circulation of radioactive isotopes leftover 
from U.S. nuclear weapons testing as the radiation passed through 
coral reef ecosystems.3 The idea of a “secondary informational 
network” governing the material energetic exchanges in idealized 
biophysical systems through mechanisms of feedback linked both 
nature and technology in the same epistemology: “The grand laws 
which define the conditions of existence (gravity, conservation, 
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network” (Odum and Patton, quoted in Bryant 2006, 88). This was 
one of the first steps in conceptually reconceiving the whole Earth 
as a whole system (Bryant 2006), but importantly, it is not the only 
one linked to the geopolitical urgency of nuclear weapons devel-
opment, as Paul Edwards (2012) and Joseph Masco (2010, 2017) 
have noted regarding the theoretical, technological, and cultural 
links between atmospheric atomic testing and the computation 
of climatic complexity. The Odums theory maintained that certain 
machines and ecosystems were equivalent on the grounds of the 
cybernetic position that self- regulating systems are universal, but 
how this term— ecosystem— informs an epistemological relationship 
between economy and ecology within an informational paradigm 
requires further clarification.
Ecosystem	as	Apparatus
In effect, as William Harold Bryant (2006, 57) comments on the 
critical historical reception of the postwar ecosystem, “cybernetics 
turned ecology into a technoscience.” While Bryant’s project is to 
recuperate the history of the term as central to then burgeoning 
twentieth- century environmental political movements and the 
conceptual distinction between destructive and green technologies, 
Fred Turner (2006, 2010) has argued that the interdisciplinary 
import of cybernetic whole- system holism into liberal political 
movements in California (especially environmentalism) laid the 
foundations for the individualizing ideology of the network society 
that drove Silicon Valley commercialism. (This is not to mention the 
ecologically devastating demattering of hardware from software 
that drove the emergence of e- waste; Gabrys 2013.) Turner’s 
critique, by way of Geoffrey Bowker (as cited in Turner 2006, 25), 
draws out how the “cybernetic rhetoric” of “legitimacy exchange” 
encapsulates a strategic “process by which experts in one area 
draw on the authority of experts in another area to justify their 
activities.” Bernard Geoghegan (2011) has furnished these “politics 
of knowledge” with an account of how the heterogeneous relation-
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accord to a set of nondiscursive “instruments and techniques” 
accompanying the conceptual development of these fields. For this 
task, Geoghegan adapts the term Michel Foucault used to describe 
the set of strategic relations between a discourse and its heteroge-
neous, generalized material implementation: dispositif (96– 98).
Geoghegan’s alteration— “the cybernetic apparatus”— is appealing 
in its deliberate conflation of Foucault’s use of the French words 
dispositif, “a strategic system of relations established among a 
heterogonous ensemble,” and appareil, “which may connote an 
instrument or tool” (Geoghegan 2011, 99). As he continues, the 
melding of the two terms in the English “apparatus”
poetically realizes that peculiar disunity- in- unity that char-
acterizes Foucault’s use of the term dispositif. Moreover, 
this exploitation of semantic dislocation thematizes a kind 
of productive terminological slippage between languages 
and disciplines that was the condition of possibility for the 
cybernetic apparatus. (99– 100, emphasis added)
Geoghegan’s description of the cybernetic apparatus is crucial, 
especially as the term fully embraces as constitutional the twofold 
ambiguity of cybernetic history: fool’s errand efforts to find a 
unified metaphysical logic for the “disunity and heterogeneity . . . 
that constituted cybernetics’s peculiar strength and attraction” 
while giving a fuller account for the nondiscursive technologies and 
institutions that usually “disappears from the historical picture and 
is replaced by hermeneutics and language” (100– 101). As Foucault 
defined the term’s deployment while defending The History of 
Sexuality (Foucault 1978) from a panel of prominent psychoanalytic 
theorists, dispositif intends “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble” 
that forms “at a given historical moment that of responding to 
an urgent need. . . . Its general form is both discursive and non- 
discursive” (Foucault 1980, 194– 95, 197). For Geoghegan, Cold War 
geopolitics supplies the urgent establishment of strategic heteroge-
neous relations that form the cybernetic apparatus.  
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cault’s criteria under similar duress. This is especially the case as a 
longer etymology of ecosystem gives this particular avenue of the 
cybernetic apparatus a privileged relationship to the nondiscursive 
processes of biophysical reality. This privilege— the ecosystem’s 
purview of environment— is inherited from the translational mech-
anism founded on the historic conceptual connections between 
ecology and economy, later repressed and packaged for use by 
cybernetic universalism.
The	Ecosystem	Apparatus:	 
Why	Management?
Refining the conceptual relationship between ecology and 
economy— and the ecosystem’s work as a translator between the 
two— benefits from an etymological detour. In Reinhold Martin’s 
history identifying how former American president Richard Nixon’s 
alleged environmental policies— including the establishment of the 
Environmental Protection Agency— complemented his economic 
positions in the 1970s, he outlines “the origins of the term ecology 
in the Greek oikos, meaning ‘house’ or ‘home,’ which also forms 
the root of economy, with the two terms translating etymologically 
as the ‘study’ and the ‘management’ of the ‘household’” (Martin 
2004, 82). This exchange between ecology and economy is visible 
in the urgent historical context of the increased media visibility of 
American environmental crises precipitated by Fordist industrial 
capitalism without ecological regulation. Nixon’s environmental 
protection assuaged public concerns following the critique enabled 
by the ecosystem’s use throughout Paul Ehrlich’s (1968) The Popula-
tion Bomb, Barry Commoner’s (1972) The Closing Circle, and the Club 
of Rome’s The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972). This is not to 
mention the observable deteriorating conditions of the American 
landscape described in Rachel Carson’s ([1962] 2002) Silent Spring, 
or the novel spectacle of polluted rivers and lakes catching fire in 
Ohio holding an emblematic visual analogy with the state violence 
of napalm weaponry use in Vietnam.
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of the dollar into gold or other reserves” (Nixon, quoted in Martin 
2004, 93) and made this full repeal of the gold standard— 
abstracting capital from materiality— permanent in part due to 
the 1973 energy crisis precipitated by the OPEC oil embargo. This 
history cynically betrays those nondiscursive instruments and 
institutions established in the fluid exchange between economy 
and ecology: the delinking of currency from materiality enabled 
new and virtually ungrounded financial practices, including “the 
speculative exchange of statistical risk,” and futures derivative trad-
ing, inclusive of environmental risk (Martin 2004, 94). This is clearly 
a politically strategic action in line with the epistemic rift grown 
between energy and information. Meanwhile, the emergence of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as an institution that corre-
sponds to the identification of “an outer limit to the exploitation of 
the external physical environment” reveals the same institution as 
a political smokescreen for the economic “compensat[ion] on the 
inside, at the semiotic level of capital- as- such” (Martin 2004, 95– 96). 
In other words, the complementary traffic between ecology and 
economy— protection and abstraction— recapitulates the Greek 
origins of the management of the household, here conceived as 
the relation between external (ecological) and internal (economic) 
management respectively.
In Giorgio Agamben’s pursuit of an etymological definition for 
Foucault’s dispositif, he lands in similar territory: “Now, what is 
the translation of the fundamental Greek term [oikonomia] in the 
writings of the Latin Fathers? Dispositio. The Latin term dispositio, 
from which the French term dispositif, or apparatus, derives, comes 
therefore to take on the complex semantic sphere of the theolog-
ical oikonomia” (Agamben 2009, 11). Agamben continues to define 
apparatus— which is linked by Martin to the relation between 
ecology and economy— as a declension of the theological oikono-
mia, otherwise “a set of practices, bodies of knowledge, measures, 
and institutions that aim to manage, govern, control, and orient— in 
a way that purports to be useful— the behaviors, gestures, and 
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ecology and economy find their way back to the indirect govern-
mental production of the subject.
Then, recalling one of the questions that opened this chapter— 
what is ecological inquiry’s distinct relationship to the nondiscur-
sive realms of technological and biophysical reality?— Agamben 
gives us the sketch of an answer via his interpretation of Foucault’s 
dispositif. This is to say that Agamben (2009) responds by linking 
dispositif to a much older philosophical question regarding the 
establishment of positive governance through theological institu-
tions: “the set of beliefs, rules, and rites that in a certain society 
and at a certain historical moment are externally imposed on 
individuals . . . the administration of the oikos (the home) and, more 
generally, management” (4, 8). This gives a partial explanation 
for why Foucault offers a secular version of technological and 
institutional governance through power’s mediation of historical 
knowledge formations, however, Foucault’s terms are more specif-
ic: “the episteme is a specifically discursive apparatus, whereas the 
apparatus in its general form is both discursive and non- discursive” 
(Foucault 1978, 197). Like the ecosystem’s theoretical blend of 
natural, technical, and anthropogenic activity, for Foucault, the 
dispositif is an operational description of both discursive and nondis-
cursive factors. Then, when Agamben reasons that dispositif comes 
to occupy a more general and developed mechanism analogous to 
positivité in Foucault’s (as cited in Agamben 2009, 3) archaeological 
theories of the 1960s, he mistakenly sells the role of the nondis-
cursive (biology, ecology, technology, institutional, etc.) short. So 
far, then, governance through the positive, strategically urgent, 
and ancillary managerial strategies of oikonomia becomes dispositif 
for Agamben. For Foucault, however, the association between 
oikonomia and dispositif produces a more complex theorization of 
governance than what is glossed by Agamben. Given the etymolog-
ical proximity of both economy and ecology (oikonomia) to dispositif, 
a fuller consideration of how nondiscursive activity factors into 
Foucault’s terminology will demonstrate why Agamben’s reading 
falters in this regard.
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Agamben misses a crucial part of this picture that proves central 
to my argument that the ecosystem is an apparatus. In an essay 
titled “What an Apparatus Is Not,” Pasquinelli (2015) provides a 
compelling counterhistory to Agamben’s question while moving 
beyond etymological convenience to give a complete account of 
the emergence of the dispositif concept. By looking to Foucault’s 
first use of the term during the lectures on the abnormal at the 
Collège de France in 1975, Pasquinelli discovers the term’s genesis 
in the holistic organicism of German Naturphilosophie. This is, not 
coincidentally, the intellectual environment within which the word 
ecology emerges in 1866, according to Ernst Haeckel’s development 
of Charles Darwin’s phrase “economy of nature— the investigation 
of the total relations of the animal both to its inorganic and its 
organic environment” (Haeckel, quoted in Golley 1993, 2, 207).
Pasquinelli argues that Foucault’s term can be traced to a 
constellation of sources that gives dispositif a renewed political 
interpretation in its possibility to recuperate the autonomy of the 
organic subject. The primary source for dispositif is not a theologi-
cal tradition but Foucault’s doctoral advisor, Georges Canguilhem, 
who drew the term into sharp relief across three texts: Essai sur 
quelques problèmes concernant le normal et le pathologique (Can-
guilhem 1943); “Machine and Organism” (Canguilhem [1952] 2008); 
and the second edition of The Normal and the Pathological with an 
appended section titled “augmenté de Nouvelles réflexions concer-
nant le normal et le pathologique” (Canguilhem [1966] 1991), which 
significantly adds reflection to the relationship between organicism 
and social theory, critiquing the concepts of organic unity that 
drove nationalist ideologies during World War II.
In sum, Canguilhem develops his definition of normativity from 
neurologist Kurt Goldstein’s theory of the organism, for which
normative power is the ability of each organism (and spe-
cifically of the human brain) to invent, modify and destroy 
its own norms, internal and external habits, rules and 
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surrounding environment), particularly in cases of illness 
and traumatic incidents and in those conditions that chal-
lenge the survival and unity of the organism. (Pasquinelli 
2015, 7)
Canguilhem’s admiration for Goldstein lies in the observation that 
the organism is a system of internal systems aiming toward dy-
namic equilibria all while in constant antagonism with the external 
environment. (In the revised portion of The Normal and the Patho-
logical that regards social theory, equilibria of systems becomes 
“homeostasis”; Canguilhem 1991, 253, 260.)
In this sense, when the organism experiences a shock, it is able 
to amplify existing, or develop entirely new, norms (perceived 
retroactively as abnormal symptoms of illness) to compensate 
for disruption and correct the system. Canguilhem, following 
Goldstein, views the “abnormal as a manifestation of a positive 
normative process itself” (Pasquinelli 2015, 7). It is in this light that 
Pasquinelli sees Canguilhem’s enduring thesis as a description of 
an organic “normative dispositif” (13):
it is the historical anteriority of the future abnormal which 
gives rise to a normative intention. The normal is the 
effect obtained by the execution of the normative project, 
it is the norm exhibited after the fact. . . . Consequently it 
is not paradoxical to say that the abnormal, while logically 
second, is existentially first. (Canguilhem 1991, 243)
Organic life is the autonomous biological development of new 
norms in response to externally encountered conditions rocking a 
normal state. New norms are perceived as abnormal due to the a 
posteriori effect of normalization: a process that spurs diagnostic 
response according to the normative intention that counterintui-
tively follows the perception of abnormality. The subsequent redef-
inition of the normal— through the categorical pathologization of 
the abnormal— returns the system to homeostasis from the shock 
delivered via encounter with the changing external environment, 
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Truly ‘sick’ is instead the organism that is incapable of invention 
and experimentation of new norms: the organism that is, para-
doxically, not capable of making mistakes” (Pasquinelli 2015, 7). As 
I imply later, it is precisely such a “true sickness” that plagues the 
adaptation- oriented policies of ecological resilience.
Pasquinelli, then, mines Canguilhem’s influence to give a clearer 
account of two distinct, yet interdependent, definitions of dispositif 
in Foucault: one nondiscursive in its distribution through the 
technological and institutional operations of indirect power, or “the 
‘organic’ incarnation of power into an impersonal infrastructure of 
procedures, standards, and norms,” and a second corresponding 
dispositif guiding the “power of normalization” that characterizes 
“the autonomous production of the categories of the normal and 
the pathological by state apparatuses” (Pasquinelli 2015, 10). 
This dynamic interplay is, in fact, easily identified in an ecological 
reading of Foucault.
Normalization is a crucial process in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 
1977). The origins of disciplinary power— often attributed to Jeremy 
Bentham’s diagram of the Panopticon— are instead more loosely 
identified as a distribution of social institutions and technologies 
established during the onset of plague management in European 
cities:
the plague as a form, at once real and imaginary, of disor-
der had as its medical and political correlative discipline . . . 
the functioning of an extensive power that bears in a dis-
tinct way over all individual bodies— this is the Utopia of a 
perfectly governed city. The plague (envisaged as a pos-
sibility at least) is the trial in the course of which one may 
define ideally the exercise of disciplinary power. (Foucault 
1977, 198, emphasis added)
As Foucault scales the normative operation of Canguilhem’s 
autonomous organism to that of disciplinary power as a plasm 
finely distributed throughout individuals and institutions within a 
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illegible threat of unperceivable disease gave rise to a new set of 
responsive disciplinary norms: quarantine, confinement, visible 
enclosure, and, most importantly, the beginning of statistical 
population censuses. For Foucault, it was plague that occasioned 
“surveillance . . . based on a system of permanent registration. . . . 
The registration of the pathological must be constantly centralized” 
(Foucault 1977, 196).
These new norms established in response to plague were initially 
abnormal social projections through which a new order of normal 
was subsequently defined as pathology. The social organism 
encountering disease as disorder returns to homeostasis with the 
medical and political correlative of discipline. Now, an immunitary 
social is better prepared for future shock with both a sense of 
normality via the pathological and those normalizing institutions 
prepared for subsequent encounters with environmental instabil-
ity. Pasquinelli argues that this disunity- in- unity passing between 
individuals, technology, and the social whole discloses the returned 
specter of organicism: “As in the nightmares of the worst German 
Staatsbiologie, Foucault’s power apparatuses appear to cast the 
shadow of a gigantic macro- organism of which we would not dare 
to think” (Pasquinelli 2015, 14). It is Foucault’s social interpretation 
of Canguilhem’s organic dispositif— and Foucault’s consequential 
hint of superorganic social unity— that sets up the terms for 
Pasquinelli’s ecological– political intervention.
First, to recap, this chapter has traced the concept of the ecosys-
tem from its proximal origins to a psychoanalytic theory of mind, 
through to its cybernetic reinvention in the postwar period, and its 
contiguity with Foucault’s notion of dispositif— both etymologically 
(oikonomia, alongside ecology and economy) and in terms of intel-
lectual heritage (Canguilhem’s encounter with German biophilos-
ophy). Then, I have demonstrated how dispositif contains an ecolog-
ical dimension through both a relationship to the nondiscursive 
(generalized governance through institutions and technologies) 
and a relationship to environment specifically (ecology as the study 
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ment, and, strategies of normative organic autonomy responding 
to external disturbance acting on internal systems of organization 
that aim toward homeostasis). When Pasquinelli (2017, 318– 19) 
states that “cybernetics was the normative project of power in the 
age of information machines— a shift that Michel Foucault . . . failed 
to record in his epistemology of power” (emphasis added), he 
implicitly recognizes the descriptive limits of dispositif as it holds a 
twofold definition (positive governance and organic social normal-
ization). This clears ground to pursue dispositif as more fully in line 
with Geoghegan’s English reformulation of the word: the disunity- 
in- unity functionality of the cybernetic apparatus.
Pasquinelli’s provocative statement about the twentieth- century 
cybernetic control society being the archive enclosing Foucault’s 
analysis is an argument supported by two compatible studies. First, 
one year before his full articulation of the “Postscript on Control 
Societies” (Deleuze [1990] 1995), Deleuze ([1989] 1995, 344– 45) 
remarked in “What Is a Dispositif?” that “the disciplines Foucault de-
scribed are the history of what we are slowly ceasing to be and our 
current apparatus is taking shape in attitudes of open and constant 
control” (emphasis added). Second, Céline Lafontaine (2007, 36) 
more explicitly sees Foucault’s thought as implicitly reflective of the 
contemporaneous “Zeitgeist” of informational control: “In defining 
power as a system of relations and emphasizing its discursive 
nature, Foucault is well and truly in line with the cybernetic rup-
ture. . . . Depoliticized, decentralized and totalized, the concept of 
power as developed by Foucault is strangely similar to cybernetic 
control.” The implications of Pasquinelli, Deleuze, and Lafontaine, 
taken together, substantiate Pasquinelli’s (2017, 314) imperative for 
“a new critique of cybernetics [that] should help to remind us of the 
role of information in the growth of the old industrial apparatus.” 
It is at this precise point between the dislocation of energy and 
information, economy and ecology, that I situate the ecosystem as 
a term describing the historical normative apparatuses critically 
taken up by Guattari’s call for collective management and control. 
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relations between mind, environment, and machine that respond 
to conditions of historical urgency, as is evident in nondiscursive 
governmental institutions, techniques, technologies, and the 
normalizing position of the adaptive social whole disposed toward 
future environmental crisis. This reading of ecosystem is further 
supported by one major historical outcome of the concept and its 
institutional application through ecological and economic resilience.
Autonomy	in	the	Organicist	Ecosystem
It is worth recalling that Tansley’s introduction of the ecosystem 
concept was a direct response to the primacy of organicism in 
ecology. The “superorganism” and “complex organism” were the 
dominant metaphors in the 1930s, when “plants that comprised 
the superorganism worked together as interacting parts, and the 
community as a whole maintained itself in dynamic equilibrium 
within the shifting conditions of its environment by means of 
physiological processes” (Bryant 2006, 44– 45). Tansley identified 
a problem within the field that the ecosystem redressed: on one 
hand, “superorganism” and “complex organism” evangelized holism 
and emergence “that created for ecology the same problems as 
did vitalism: an orientation toward untestable, unempirical ex-
planations for idealized constructs” (46), while on the other hand, 
previous models reducing organic complexity to “the mechanistic 
actions of molecules” missed the functionality of how many  
parts “worked together to maintain the integrity of the whole”  
(33). Then, the utility of the ecosystem concept was located within 
how
living things lost their privileged status and became, along 
with non- living matter, mutually formative components 
of a larger, encompassing entity. The ecosystem concept 
oriented ecology toward process and dynamics and away 
from taxonomy and natural history; toward the particular 
and the material, and away from the ideal and unverifi-
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binary by providing a rigorously materialist, empirical way 
to address wholes without reducing their complexity. (48)
By 1942, Raymond Lindeman had published a quantifiable study 
of solar energy passing through a lake ecosystem as physicochem-
ically processed by “producers,” “consumers,” and “decomposers” 
(Bryant 2006, 48). It was this conceptual movement toward the 
quantifiable study of energy within a thermodynamically modeled 
physical– natural system, constituted by interacting “biotic and 
abiotic components” (48), that primed the ecosystem for its recep-
tion in the cybernetic sciences. The introduction of information 
feedback, as the control mechanism for energy transfer, gave a 
theoretical framework that accounted for self- regulation in a given 
idealized biophysical system.
Just as Tansley appeared suspicious of organicism in ecology, so 
is Pasquinelli of this impulse in Foucault. Canguilhem’s theory 
of the abnormal— and its critical social application to normative 
French institutions— crystallized specifically within postwar France 
due to heightened recognition of the “dangers of organicism” that 
Pasquinelli (2015, 11– 12) defines as “the metaphors that were born 
in the biological sciences and then clumsily transplanted into the 
political sciences.” This is the case, he maintains, because Canguil-
hem was at the time fully aware of how “German Naturphilosophie, 
from Kant to Goethe, from Humboldt to Haeckel, from Driesch to 
Uexküll, is built up around the organic unity of the living, which is 
then delivered ‘hands tied’ to political philosophy and legal theory” 
(12). Implied here is an intellectual mistranslation bluntly shuttled 
from Naturphilosophie— including Haeckel’s ecology— directly into 
social theorization, contributing toward the “organicist paradigm 
[that] led German society to drift, eventually, into the catastrophe 
of Nazism” (13).
Canguilhem, for Pasquinelli, offered a careful philosophical 
distinction that challenged the organicist perspective maintaining 
an easy application of the procedure of the normative to social 
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internal environment of organs that can grow but not significantly 
change their configuration,” yet “society [i]s an external disposition 
of machine- organs that often extend and accumulate against 
each other,” meaning that the individual and the technological/
institutional implementation of the social “evolve in a completely 
different way” (12). The organism and social technologies/institu-
tions evolve in completely different ways. Pasquinelli concludes that 
Foucault’s inheritance of the dispositif loses Canguilhem’s insistence 
that “the social organization is able to invent new organs that are no 
longer an imitation of nature but follow its sense of production,” as 
Foucault instead reversed: “the normative autonomy of the subject 
and, specifically, technology as a potentiality of the living” (12, 11). 
Foucault’s alteration of his advisor’s thesis formulates “knowledge 
as an expression of power upon life” rather than “knowledge as an 
expression of life,” thereby withdrawing the “normative potentia” (13) 
of the organism to articulate the full theorization of power found in 
the dual (nondiscursive and normative) dispositif. Hence Foucault 
maintains a hint of the superorganic unity in the dispositif that 
Canguilhem so carefully sought to avoid. It is Pasquinelli’s interven-
tion to imply critical value in the conceptual distinction between the 
organic autonomy of the subject and the organic autonomy of the 
machine— a crucial difference easily effaced in the dynamics of the 
theorization of power as circulating and accumulating in popula-
tions, institutions, and technologies.
This intellectual history is important because it runs parallel to a se-
ries of conceptual movements coupling the organic to the political 
as filtered through the twentieth- century cybernetic ecosystem. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, James Lovelock was studying the possibility 
of life on Mars while working for NASA. Drawing knowledge from 
cybernetic ecosystem theory that maintained that biophysical real-
ity worked as a materially closed, energetically open whole system 
governed by informational self- regulation, Lovelock reasoned that 
since “Earth’s air was full of reactive gases of biological origin,” then 
“the composition of the atmosphere in fact depended upon the 
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line of inquiry, Lovelock determined that NASA didn’t need to visit 
Mars to ascertain whether the planet hosted organic life. He could 
deduct that answer based on observing the Martian atmosphere 
by telescope from Earth, as theoretically understanding the 
composition of an atmosphere as being part of a system composed 
of interacting biotic (if present) and abiotic factors supported the 
inference that a planet’s lifeless character would be reflected in 
spectral analysis of the chemical makeup of the given atmosphere. 
If Mars had organic life, you should be able to see its effects on a 
planetary scale.
Lovelock (1995, 10) returned this observation to the planet Earth in 
his durable thesis, the “Biocybernetic Universal System Tendency/
Homeostasis,” which maintained,
Life on Earth shaped and determined the physical com-
position of the planet, just as the physical planet shaped 
and determined that character of life. . . . Life exists 
planet- wide or not at all. . . . The quantity and distribu-
tion of organisms would need to be sufficient to regulate 
the planetary environment and keep it comfortable for 
living things. . . . Species do not merely adapt, through 
evolution, to the environment they find themselves in. 
They continually change their physical and chemical envi-
ronment. Species and environment co- evolve in an indi-
visible process. . . . Viewed as a whole integrated system, 
the Earth could be considered a single living organism in its 
own right. . . . It was self- organizing and self- regulating; 
through cybernetic circuits of negative feedback, the 
planet maintained itself in dynamic equilibrium, just as an 
individual organism maintains homeostasis. (Bryant 2006, 
229– 30, emphasis added)
After receiving the advice of his friend and neighbor, author William 
Golding, Lovelock (1995, vii) renamed his idea of a self- regulating 
and complex unity “Gaia.”
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from more traditional organicist notions? Complexity and dis-
equilibrium. Beginning in the late 1970s and building momentum 
through the 1980s, the idea of complexity had profound implica-
tions for both the ecological and economic sciences. Looking at 
Gaia, what Lovelock made clear was that Earth’s history of life did 
not diminish in biological difference according to an entropic pro-
pulsion toward the heat death of equilibria. Rather, life responds 
to thresholds of disequilibria by progressing toward an increasingly 
complex diversity of forms that regulate the abiotic and material 
imbalances that support the conditions for the phenomenon of life 
itself. As Melinda Cooper (2008, 35) explains regarding Lovelock’s 
conceptual move from the thermodynamic planetary evolutionary 
model of the biosphere to one of complexity, as illustrated by Gaia, 
“life, in this view, is intrinsically expansive— its field of stability is 
neither rigorously determined nor constant. . . . Its law of evolution 
is one of increasing complexity rather than entropic decline, and its 
specific creativity is autopoietic rather than adaptive.” Biospheric 
self- regulation was located within the regenerative capacities of life 
in its interrelating variety, and more specifically, microbial life was 
highlighted as the most crucial component in the system given its 
ability to reanimate in the most extreme geographies.
Cooper argues that Gaia theory is a part of a broader and, again, 
disunified- yet- unified ecological response that folded alongside 
an economic cooptation. She locates the traffic of this ecosystemic 
apparatus in the reaction to the restrictive theoretical and political 
challenges posed by environmental steady- state advocacy, like the 
Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972) and Beyond 
the Limits: Global Collapse or a Sustainable Future (Meadows et al. 
1992). Upon comprehending the consequences of how 97 percent 
of industrial production was dependent on nonrenewable fossil 
fuel extraction, the imperative offered by then- nascent degrowth 
environmental perspectives maintained that “the earth is finite. . . . 
Limits to growth . . . were time- like rather than space- like. This 
meant that we might have already gone beyond the threshold at 
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sumed, long before we would notice its actual depletion” (Cooper 
2008, 17). The Club of Rome had concluded after two studies that 
capitalist economic growth could not outstrip the material eco-
logical equilibria of the planet without encountering catastrophe. 
It followed that solid- state economies were mandatory to stave 
off collapse, as plans to continue neglecting the limits operated in 
ignorance that “we were already living beyond the limit, in a state 
of suspended crisis, innocently waiting for the future to boomerang 
back in our faces” (Cooper 2008, 17). Rather than act on the Club 
of Rome’s prescription, and in accordance with the ecosystemic 
drive of “capitalist delirium” (Cooper 2008, 21) that reestablishes 
the ordinates of growth and accumulation in the bald- faced reality 
of scarcity, the entwined limits to both life (ecology) and capital 
(economy) needed to be invented and reinvented so as to promise 
a future both livable and returnable. The promise, of course, was 
not offered to everyone.
Cooper (2008) uses the term bioeconomy to describe the codevel-
opment of the twentieth- century turn in economic, earth- system, 
and life sciences toward complexity, as each field responded to 
theories proposing limits to growth as though in concert. For Love-
lock, Lynn Margulis, and Dorion Sagan, “their rereading of evolution 
thus concludes with certitude that microbial life will outsurvive all 
limits to growth— certainly it will outsurvive the human race and 
quite possibly the end of the earth” (Cooper 2008, 39). In a political 
indictment of how the coherent philosophy of Lovelock’s Gaia 
hypothesis was mistranslated into a series of neoliberal economic 
policies and institutions, the idea that the planet was an auto-
poietic living system capable of self- regulation and autonomous 
sustainability gave ground to rationalize strategies of financial 
biospeculation intended to stave off a meaningful divestment from 
oil. Cooper writes,
[Biosphere science, complexity science, and related theo-
ries] may well have their origins in essentially revolution-
ary histories of the earth . . . , but in the current context 
80 they are more likely to lend themselves to distinctly 
neoliberal antienvironmentalism. . . . Whether this is a 
misinterpretation of complexity theory, at odds with the 
intentions of the theorists themselves, is in a sense beside 
the point, since in the absence of any substantive critique 
of political economy, any philosophy of life as such runs 
the risk of celebrating life as it is. And the danger is only 
exacerbated in a context such as ours, where capitalist 
relations have so intensively invested in the realm of 
biological reproduction. . . . It is because life is neguentro-
pic, it seems, that economic growth is without end. And it 
is because life is self- organizing that we should reject all 
state regulation of markets. This is a vitalism that comes 
dangerously close to equating the evolution of life with 
capital. (41– 42)
On one side of the mistranslation, contradictory theories of ecolog-
ical modernization and green capitalism introduced the imperative 
to grow capitalist economies to the tune of sustainability, only 
to end up making unachievable promises beyond the limits. On 
another side, environmental regulation was repudiated with the 
charge of anthropomorphism, as Cooper identifies Lovelock’s con-
tinued endorsement of nuclear power as a symptom of the anti-
humanism present in the most drastic interpretation of Gaia: does 
Earth truly need humans— or all humans— to survive? Probably not, 
as long as the microbes will.
Cooper’s theory poses a difficult problem: while complexity and its 
various incarnations yield a refined image of the planet’s mech-
anisms, history shows us that there are those who deliberately 
exploit that knowledge in bad faith of the stated aspirations of 
good science. By acknowledging the philosophical coherence of 
Earth as a complex system, the question gets turned around: 
rather than hold a theory of life responsible for its inheritors, what 
instead is required of critique to meet the life of ideas on political 
grounds? As a methodological inspiration, I advance the ecosystem 
as the conceptual ground supporting exchanges between natural 
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exchanges as facilitated by the disunity- in- unity inherited from the 
cybernetic apparatus.
Economists and policy makers from the Carter and Reagan 
administrations through to the Clinton and Bush governments 
formulated responsive positions to the determination of limits to 
growth by proposing speculative economies drawn from knowl-
edge in the life sciences. In one compelling example, citing George 
W. Bush’s “notoriously antienvironmental” regime, Cooper (2008, 
47) illustrates how his Department of Energy’s Office of Science 
in 2004 “adopt[ed] a language that recalls the Gaia hypothesis as 
much as the more economistic calculations of ecological mod-
ernization [by looking] to the history of microbial and biospheric 
evolution as a source of future solutions to the looming energy 
crisis [and] plac[ing] special emphasis on the potential industrial 
applications of extremophiles.” Gaia’s foundational interest in life’s 
capacity for regeneration in the most extreme geographies begins 
to look like some of the promised fallback fantasies intended to 
move economic development past limits projected regarding the 
scarcity of nonrenewable resources. After years of implementing 
and institutionalizing such strategies, Cooper argues that we’re 
now well beyond the limits and waiting for the boomerang. But this 
isn’t the most frightening prospect. The indirect consequence of 
such avid assurance of growth- past- the- limits is the preparation of 
a new set of cynical strategies: the imagination of the production of 
surplus value from an industrially scorched earth. Otherwise, how 
can surplus be extracted from a future that assumes that life will 
continue to grow in the ruins of capitalism?
Financing	the	Whole	Earth	as	a	 
Whole	System
Truth is stranger than fiction, as one such financial imaginary 
emerges in the evolving transactions of the cybernetic apparatus- 
become- ecosystem. In 1984, during fears of nuclear apocalypse 
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colonies in preservation of growing populations and industry, the 
private research corporation Space Biospheres Ventures started to 
consolidate an experimentally sustainable commune into a series 
of tests. These were outwardly capitalist endeavors to develop 
patents for space habitats in the isolation of the Arizona desert. 
The tests led to the establishment of Biosphere 2: an enclosed, 
self- regulating ecosystem designed to support human, animal, and 
plant life without any material exchange with, or external reliance 
upon, Biosphere 1— planet Earth.
The experiment took cues from Princeton physicist Gerard 
O’Neill’s proposal that self- regulating space colonies were a viable 
technoecological solution to the perceived global population crisis 
and the apparent limit to an expanding society’s dependence on 
oil and accordingly turbulent geopolitics. The three- acre enclosure 
cost $200 million and is the world’s largest ecological experiment, 
funded by a Texan oil magnate named Ed Bass. While Biosphere 
2, over the various experiments it ran, ended up producing a large 
amount of valuable climate change research since its beginnings in 
the early 1990s, Peder Anker (2017, 125) recounts that the project 
had less utopian motivations than its stated goal of simulating a 
space colony: “The aim of the Biosphere 2 was also to build a shel-
ter in which Bass and his friends could survive in co- evolution with 
thousands of other species in case the eco- crisis turned Biosphere 
1 into a dead planet like Mars [and t]hey believed that ‘Glass Ark’ 
could secure their personal survival while at the same time rescue 
some of the world’s biodiversity.”
The history of this project is well covered elsewhere,4 but recent 
political events have shaped the importance of Biosphere 2. The 
presence of Alt- right spokesman and former advisor to President 
Trump Steve Bannon as an intermittent financial administrator for 
the project between 1991 and 1994 merits a brief consideration in 
light of how Cooper sees the mistranslation of Gaia’s ecosystemic 
vitalism as key to understanding emergent strategies of speculative 
investment. As recently reported, part of Bannon’s interest in 
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scientists were evacuated from the enclosure, Bannon used the 
heightened CO2 levels that were consistent with modeled expec-
tations of a world undergoing anthropogenic climate change “to 
measure how quickly commercially harvested trees would grow in 
a carbon dioxide– rich atmosphere” (Niiler 2016). “[The trees] shot 
right up” (Niiler 2016), said Tony Burgess, a botanist working there 
at the time. In Bannon’s eyes, Biosphere 2 became commercially 
viable as a pilot plant for how to make money from climate change. 
This is a glimpse of an economic investment strategy literally bank-
ing on the failure of planet Earth. Once visible as the whole system 
of Biosphere 1, the Earth’s anthropogenic climate also enters the 
financial system. Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009, 22) has influentially 
argued that “climate change, refracted through global capital, will 
no doubt accentuate the logic of inequality that runs through the 
rule of capital,” yet “there are no lifeboats here for the rich and the 
privileged.”5 In final recognition that the limits of growth come with 
a price, Chakrabarty’s thesis is challenged by Bannon’s Biosphere 
and those who seek to finance the time that remains.6
In their shared perspective on the dangers posed by theories of 
life articulated in the absence of a critique of political economy, 
I see Pasquinelli and Cooper as compatible in diagnosing such 
ecological– political problems that result from the ecosystem 
apparatus’s merger of ecology and economy. As Cooper (2008, 49) 
suggests, responding to such historical interdisciplinary transla-
tions involves an “effective ecological counterpolitics” that attends 
to the delirious drive to model future worlds while destroying them 
in the present under the assumption of maintaining the deleterious 
status quo— the delirium that characterizes “[our] living on the 
cusp between petrochemical and biospheric modes of accumu-
lation, the foregone conclusion of oil depletion and the promise 
of bioregeneration.” This counterpolitics requires “work in the 
prospective mode, to detect and preempt the new forms of scarcity 
that are being built into the promise of a bioregenerative economy” 
(49– 50). In the case of Bannon’s Biosphere modeling the surplus 
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anthropogenic change, the prospect of serious climate mitigation 
appears forgone as the continuation of fossil fuel denominated 
industrial production is assumed. Critique needs to continue with 
Cooper’s temporal position in mind: who is lining up to finance the 
conditions of continued growth in an anthropogenic future?
In a complementary position, Pasquinelli offers a philosophical 
account for the renewed potential of social technologies by way 
of Canguilhem’s careful positioning toward organicism, a concept 
that appears alongside the prospective surplus value exposed by 
a Gaian planet. Pasquinelli (2015, 12) sees political possibility, like 
Guattari, in technology as developed aside from capitalism, but 
technology must be considered as clearly distinct from the patterns 
of organic autonomy: “I propose to call biomorphism that mode in 
which life does not imitate itself, but is projected into the ab- normal 
social relations, mutant relations of production and further planes 
of consistency without looking back.” His conceptual distinction 
most clearly illustrates the need to divorce the ecological study of 
life from the economic study of material governance, coordinated 
as they are within the ecosystem apparatus.
While subjective organic autonomy remains crucial, danger 
appears in uniting sociality, machines, and environments under the 
simple and immanent ontological banner of holistic organization. 
Thus, when Guattari (1989, 142) states that “the ultimate goal of 
work and human activities in terms of criteria other than those 
of profit and productivity,” it is in line with Pasquinelli’s (2015, 1) 
renewed mandate to think through “the normative autonomy of 
the subject and its constituent abnormality” as distinct from those 
modal properties of institutional and technological forms.7 The 
nondiscursive operations of social institutions and machines re-
quire their functionality to be recalibrated outside the parameters 
of economic growth. Biomorphism is a useful term to orient this 
challenging reconsideration. From the ecosystemic fold of ecology 
and economy, institutional and technological developments that do 
not directly mimic the automated production of life for the purpose 
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toward an autonomous acting capacity that is truly ecological in 
the sense of technical individuation without capitalist coordinates. 
From Cooper and Pasquinelli, politics requires an autonomous 
human subject organizing against the delirious pattern of growth 
and its deferred limits. Equally, this program calls for room for the 
potential of social technologies to be articulated outside the easy 
translation of life into industry, as growth is mistakenly conceived 
as the equivalent purpose of both organism and machine.
As Philip Mirowski concurs, it is with such sustained conflations of 
economy and ecology that the shadow of geoengineering respons-
es to climate change appears not as true salvation but as the ulti-
mate backup plan for the eventualities of disaster capitalism: “The 
neoliberal fallback after the ‘cap- and- trade’ model inevitably fails 
will be geoengineering, which derives from the core neoliberal doc-
trine that entrepreneurs will innovate market solutions to address 
dire environmental problems” (Mirowski, Walker, and Abboud 
2013). The promise of continued economic growth is made in bad 
faith, carved from a burgeoning financial imagination reconceiving 
a wrecked Earth as one prospectively terraformed, primed as it is 
for the continued extraction of surplus. This imaginary is already 
prototyped, and in the patenting phase, as of Bannon’s Biosphere.
Trump’s	Ecosystem	and	the	 
Problem	of	Resilience
Following a highly active hurricane season, CNN ran the headline 
“Trump Administration Swaps ‘Climate Change’ for ‘Resilience’” 
(Green 2017). The reporter, Miranda Green, highlights the semiotic 
shifts that followed the transition from Barack Obama’s administra-
tion to Trump’s environmental policy:
In the wake of Hurricane Irma, both Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator Brock Long 
and acting Homeland Security Secretary Elaine Duke 
avoided explicitly answering whether the government 
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hurricanes. Instead, they both said the focus should be on 
resiliency.
Long’s response is particularly striking: “Regardless of what causes 
disasters, it’s our job within the Department of Homeland Security 
[DHS] and FEMA to manage the consequences. . . . The only way we 
become resilient as a nation is we have to create the true culture of 
preparedness among our citizenry” (Green 2017, emphasis added). 
The report continues by tracking a wide range of similar linguistic 
slippages occurring throughout various departments developing 
environmental perspectives under Trump. Elsewhere, the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) appeared completely baffled by 
Trump’s announcement of a $12 billion competition “to increase 
resilience to future flood and hurricane disasters,” which the NRDC 
expert highlighted as “an unexpected proposal” given Trump’s 
outright antagonism toward climate science: “NRDC has floated a 
similar idea with Congress” (Moore 2017). What logic brings Trump 
and the NRDC together under the same sign?
Brian Massumi (2009, 155) has excavated Foucault’s preliminary 
theory of environmentalité— environmental governance— within 
handwritten manuscript notes from the lectures on The Birth 
of Biopolitics: “[Environmentalité] asserts its own normality, of 
crisis: the anywhere, anytime potential for the emergence of the 
abnormal. . . . Environmentality as a mode of power is left no 
choice but to make do with the abnormally productive ‘autonomy.’” 
The theory, sketched out on the horizon of Foucault’s thinking, is 
incomplete at best but proves immensely generative for Massumi’s 
description of a “war– weather continuum” (158) visible in the 
shared and preemptory relationship maintained between the 
military preparedness for and neoliberal economic financing of 
ecological crisis. This gives a partial explanatory framework for the 
interplay between “neoconservative war power” (Massumi 2009, 
179) and “disaster capitalism” (Klein 2007) most apparent in George 
W. Bush’s waffling between Hurricane Katrina as a natural disaster 
and as a national economic emergency. Instead,
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conservatism’s naturalization of national security activity 
is one half of a double movement. As power moves into 
the bare- active realm of emergence to bring life back, 
life’s induced return is met by an economic expansionism 
that wraps life’s re- arising into its own global unfolding. 
(Massumi 2009, 174)
In response to Hurricane Katrina, Bush redeployed the allegedly 
domestic National Guard, recently returned from Iraq, in New 
Orleans. The U.S. military, which was legally reserved for foreign 
incursion, also circulated throughout Louisiana, collapsing domes-
tic security and foreign invasion within the same local environment. 
Again, the ecological/economic management of the interior and 
exterior of the household seems at play. With the Pentagon’s re-
mapping of civilian and military space came a heinously oppressive 
program of economic exploitation in the broad implementation 
of what Naomi Klein (2007) has termed the shock doctrine. This 
doctrine amounts to having free market policies lying in wait for a 
crisis opportunity, as crisis etymologically indicates the provoked 
need for swift decision and implementation. This strategy plays 
out more closely to political elites employing government to 
further consolidate power, with the banner of “free market” being 
an ideological tool employed in name alone to otherwise secure 
profits. Most cynical might be Milton Friedman, aged ninety- three, 
who saw Katrina as an opportunity to privatize the Louisiana school 
system— a process prepared for and completed before most of 
New Orleans’s poor were able to return to their homes.
As Massumi writes, such events betray a specific strategy to the 
emerging form of environmental power that normalizes potential 
exposure to state and environmental violence while using those 
same conditions to further economize life. Environmental threats 
are described as indiscriminate, so the military’s response must 
be equally ubiquitous and primed like an atmosphere on the 
verge of precipitation. “The enterprise aspect of Bush’s Katrina 
response was represented by his strategy of replacing government 
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the shelter of government- planned and government- regulated 
redevelopment for the gale winds of enterprising investment, 
following eagerly upon those of Katrina” (Massumi 2009, 174). Bush 
didn’t want to return a sense of safety to Louisiana; he wanted to 
instill a (false) sense of prosperity. Rather than restoration to the 
homeostatic norms, a new systemic positionality toward the future 
emerged as the city was reconceived as a resilient one according 
to the inputs of neoconservative security and neoliberal econom-
ics. This is, so far, a familiar reading for how Bush’s response to 
a hurricane melded neoconservative militarism with neoliberal 
economic strategies. It is more difficult to trace how this doctrine 
has remained in place through succeeding political administrations.
What makes Massumi’s text such a compelling theoretical frame-
work is his insistence that Bush’s “national enterprise emergency” 
was transformed into a fully fledged “natural security” (159) for 
Obama’s national security transition team: “the Obama adminis-
tration’s defense of the Bush era rules of exception, which came as 
a cruel surprise to many hopers, indicates a trans- administration 
tendency to hold the potential for preemption and its economic 
coupling in ready reserve” (180). Throughout Massumi’s essay, one 
cannot shake the image of two semiotically distinct yet continuous 
political regimes— Bush then Obama— reacting to natural and 
military threats uniformly through the same terms of ubiquitous 
yet aleatory environmental disruptions. At times, it almost reads 
as though Massumi describes the state as an organism: adapting 
to a changing external environment through internal renovations 
(elections, policies, and infrastructure) while retaining the same 
outward compulsive position toward preparedness for disequilibri-
um. Is this an example of statecraft responding to the ecosystemic 
fold of ecology and economy?
It’s most clear in Obama’s government, I argue, in the translation 
of the “War on Terror” to what the Economist termed in 2014 the 
“War on Ebola.”8 On October 23, 2014, Craig Spencer returned to 
New York from Guinea after treating Ebola victims. He contracted 
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way around the city in the time being. Russel Brandom recounts 
just how totally surveilled Spencer’s life was before learning he had 
the disease and how publicly those details traveled after diagnosis 
to help subdue panic: “Once he was back in New York, nearly 
everything he did left a trail. There’s a reason for the obsessive 
attention: staying ahead of the virus” (Brandom 2014). A culture of 
resilience was propagated as an immunitary move: New Yorkers 
learned every minute detail of Spencer’s two days to both assure 
the population of their public health and prepare them in case of 
an outbreak.
It is surprisingly easy to switch in a terrorist suspect in the above 
scenario, as, after all, to find out who Spencer contacted in those 
two days while moving through the New York public, all the DHS 
needed to do was interpret data from the already up- and- running 
post- 9/11 security apparatus. Implied is a certain conceptual 
equivalence of external threat from the perspective of the state, 
spanning the human (terrorist) and nonhuman (virus). Institutional 
response to the externality of environmental threat, whether 
natural or national security, is a functionality maintained from one 
administration to the next. My reading of the incident is further 
supported by Obama’s 2015 speech on the deployment of the 
Public Health Service Commissioned Corps to combat Ebola in 
West Africa:
Last year, as Ebola spread in West Africa and I said that 
fighting this disease was more than a national security 
priority . . . , understand that this corps of public health 
professionals are on the frontlines all the time. And when 
you think of some of the most difficult, challenging trag-
edies or public health challenges that we’ve experienced 
over the last several decades, these are the folks who 
have been there from the start. After 9/11, after hurri-
canes, after Sandy Hook, after Deepwater Horizon or the 
Boston Marathon bombing, they come in to help support, 
advise and oftentimes provide direct treatment in some 
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only helped to keep the American people safe; they led a 
global response. (Obama 2015)
Most notable about this speech is the equivalence and conflation 
of domestic threats with crises abroad; terrorism with disease, 
infrastructural failure, and natural disaster; and international 
health with national security. This is not to mention the semiotic re-
inscription of health workers in explicitly militarized terms, or what 
the development of “public health infrastructure in many of these 
countries” (Obama 2015) might entail in imperial- economic terms. 
In the Ebola crisis, the dangers of external threats (environmental 
or otherwise) are topologically fed directly inward toward domestic 
cultures of preparedness and civic security. As Massumi (2009, 155) 
inquires, “What systematicity is this?”
Cooper (2010) has concretely identified this system of governance 
as appearing in the ecosystem apparatus. In her study of the 
booming market of American investment in weather derivative 
financing— second- order speculative futures trading that hedges 
environmental risk— she explains how the financing of the 
conditions consistent with climate change were first enabled by 
Richard Nixon’s removal of the gold standard: “We cannot predict 
the unfolding of climate change and its effects on prices, even in 
the short term. Its parameters of variation are unknowable. Yet 
we can create a derivatives contract allowing us to wager on this 
very uncertainty. . . . What is at stake in the circulation of capital 
today is . . . the event of turbulence itself that becomes tradable” 
(178, 179– 80). Her broader argument focuses on the magnetic 
denomination of debt issuance in global financial markets by the 
U.S. dollar— “the world’s de facto reserve currency” (168)— and 
the accordingly distinct American “privilege of paying its foreign 
debts in its own currency” (169) as a topological ordering of “world 
imperial power” (181) supported by unrivaled military dominance. 
“The problem confronting [centrist American think tank] strategists 
is how to navigate the US- dollar denominated world through the 
extreme turbulence of financial, climate and energy crisis” (169). By 
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climate change is viewed as legible according to increasingly vola-
tile conditions of future turbulence marked by uncertain weather 
as (priceable) environmental risk, uncertain geopolitics rendered as 
destabilized states (environmental refugees, the testing of critical 
infrastructure, etc.), and resource scarcity (especially oil deple-
tion). (Nearly beside the point are the new avenues of dethawed 
access to militarily contested and valuable Arctic territory made 
increasingly available by global warming.) With turbulent climates 
of finance and geopolitics looming within the strategic planning of 
economic and military policy, Cooper charts designs being drawn 
up not only to survive the turbulence but to profit and securitize 
in its wake. This logical position toward the future perversely 
underwrites the continued manufacture of said turbulent condi-
tions by maintaining fossil fuel– based growth economies. Then, the 
integrated response to the reticulation of future financial, ecologi-
cal, and energy crisis assumes that
turbulence cannot be averted then. . . . Rather the aim will 
be that of maintaining the topological cohesion of a world 
in and through the most extreme periods of turbulence. 
In complex systems theory, this property of topological 
cohesion is referred to as “resilience” (the term, which 
was first used in its contemporary scientific understand-
ing in ecosystems theory, is now ubiquitous in strategic 
thinking). (183)
The shift to resilience relies on the hedge against serious global 
warming mitigation or climate stabilization. For Cooper, resilience 
is the working strategy to strengthen American national security 
(neoconservatism) and economic dominance (neoliberalism) 
through impending crises while maintaining the topology of  
American geopolitical supremacy defined along the axes of 
debt imperialism and military strength. By pivoting toward a 
future- oriented system best suited to take advantage of inbound 
turbulent conditions, material acts in prevention are functionally 
discouraged.
92 In a subsequent study, Cooper and Jeremy Walker have described 
in depth the genealogy of resilience that, unsurprisingly, follows 
from the ecosystem apparatus. They highlight the symmetry 
between ecologist C. S. Holling and his introduction of complexity 
science to ecosystem theory, with the late neoliberal economic 
philosophy of Friedrich Hayek. Cooper and Walker (2012, 145– 46) 
illustrate the disunity- in- unity characterizing the conceptual appli-
cation of complexity to economy and ecology as such:
The key image of science that propelled the formalisation 
of economics (in the 1870s) and ecology (in the 1950s), 
was of smooth and continuous returns to equilibrium 
after shock, an image derived from different vintages of 
mechanics and thermodynamics. Holling’s widely cited pa-
per “Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems” (1973) 
represents the destabilisation of the notion of “equilibri-
um” as the core of the ecosystem concept and the normal 
terminus of ecosystem trajectory. . . . What Holling seeks 
to define instead, is a complex notion of resilience which 
can account for the ability of an ecosystem to remain 
cohesive even while undergoing extreme perturbations. If 
stability refers to the familiar notion of a return to equilib-
rium, “ecological” resilience designates the complex biotic 
interactions that determine “the persistence of relation-
ships within a system,” thus resilience is “a measure of 
the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state 
variables . . . and still persist.”
Cooper and Walker proceed by mapping how Holling’s concepts 
guide environmental policy development in several prominent 
think tanks, most notably the Resilience Alliance. Holling’s later 
ecological theories transition toward figuring capital accumulation 
away from linear models of political economy and into the “crisis 
tendencies of complex adaptive systems” (147) giving foundation 
for resource management theories advocating the financing, 
securitizing, and militarization of the biosphere. While Holling and 
Hayek did not cite one another, the two have structural similarities 
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systems theory. Walker and Cooper imply a mutual conceptual 
foundation, which is by now familiar to the disunity- in- unity strate-
gies of the cybernetic apparatus and its ecosystemic by- product.
Intuitively, Massumi’s question— what systematicity is this?— 
suggests a common logic preempting a future defined by an 
increasingly turbulent set of atmospheric, financial, and insurgent 
conditions, which appears satisfied by Cooper and Walker’s 
description of resilience. Resilience policies semiotically absorb the 
concerns of varied administrations, including Bush’s consolidation 
of FEMA and the EPA under the guidance of the Department of 
Homeland Security’s 2007 mandate to use natural disasters “as 
opportunities for the selective transformation of urban space” 
(Cooper and Walker 2012, 154). Or, resilience is visible in the 
Obama administration’s couching of Deepwater Horizon in terms 
of a terrorist attack, wherein the linguistic shifts along the war– 
weather continuum serve to justify the unavoidable dependence 
of the security state upon the petrochemical industry (and its 
reserves) to fuel its war machine both domestically and abroad 
(McClintock 2012, 4). In words that portend the Trump administra-
tion’s call for a “true culture of preparedness among our citizenry” 
(Green 2017), Cooper and Walker (2012, 155) discern in resilience a 
“general systems theory of ‘socio- ecological governance’” forming 
a completely normalized sensibility oriented toward maintaining 
multidynamic stability as though a coherent program of civic 
defense: “Within this optic, preparedness would seem to demand 
the generic ability to adapt to unknowable contingencies rather 
than actual prevention or indeed adaptation to future events of 
known probability” (153). Correspondingly, they continue, Hayek’s 
late theories posit the equivalence of catastrophes “(natural, social 
or economic)” as an inevitable failure inherent to the limits of 
socialized management and control, as though catastrophe is the 
teleological consequence of governmental intervention (Cooper 
and Walker 2012, 154). Then, from Hayek’s perspective, this means 
that the failure to mitigate climate change is not itself the problem. 
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economic philosophy with contempt for political strategies of social 
governance: “what is called for instead is a ‘culture’ of resilience 
that turns crisis response into a strategy of permanent, open- 
ended responsiveness, integrating emergency preparedness into 
the infrastructures of everyday life and the psychology of citizens” 
(153– 54). These are nearly the same terms adopted by Trump’s 
FEMA. Within this optic, addressing climate change is not about 
moving society off oil, as there is no society. Cultures of resilience 
provide an alternate solution. From the perspective of resilience, 
it’s about deregulation and encouraging individuals toward cultures 
of disaster preparation.
As in the integrated whole of the organicist state and Guattari’s 
three ecologies, ecological resilience and its prepared security 
infrastructure imagines its environmental subjects as a “culture” in 
the bacterial sense: growth from a nourishing medium that rhetor-
ically enlists the agency of the full political spectrum. An allegedly 
environmentalist program, resilience proves deeply neoliberal in 
its discount of mitigation strategies. Individuals are positioned as 
ecosystemic effects without any autonomous potential to re- form 
environmental relations outside the twinned concerns of national 
security and petrochemical industrial growth, otherwise, ecology 
and economy. Collectivity is effectively written out in advance by 
the preemptory position seeking to maintain cohesive adaptation 
of individual survivors during inbound turbulence.
It would be irresponsible to discuss resilience without pointing to 
the deep strain of eugenics that the discourse cultivates, espe-
cially with regard to climate migration and refugees. Resilience 
“reiterates and modifies the Darwinian law of natural selection” 
by recalibrating social norms toward the turbulent conditions of 
nonequilibrium: “in this context, the appeal to ecological security 
is often invoked as a means of distinguishing those who are 
sufficiently resilient to survive as dignified participants in a globally 
integrated world from those who are either too resilient or not 
resilient enough” (Cooper and Walker 2012, 156). Orit Halpern, in 
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lowing Hurricane Sandy, identifies how the phrase both abstracts 
the source of violence (industrial capitalism) and cultivates a sense 
of civic “resilient hope” for urban renewal, all while encouraging 
belief in the “continue[d] myths of economic and technical growth 
while embracing a future understood as finite and catastrophic” 
(Halpern, Mitchell, and Geoghegan 2017). This draws into sharp 
relief the racist logic running through the gentrification prospects 
of resilience operations at scale: “planned obsolescence and 
preemptive destruction combine here to encourage the introduc-
tion of more computation into the environment— and emphasize 
as well that resilience of the human species may necessitate 
the sacrifice of ‘suboptimal’ populations” (Halpern, Mitchell, and 
Geoghegan 2017, 123). In all the technofantasy architectural 
mock- ups of floating smart cities adapting to climate change, there 
remain the hidden labor conditions and the unequal allocation of 
scarce materials further exposing those historically placed at risk, 
as obscured sacrifices are made for the tradable, “sustainable,” and 
survivable future. All the while, Exxon builds oil rigs to adjust to ris-
ing seas (Lieberman and Rust 2015). Precisely what Guattari meant 
by Donald Trump’s algaeic proliferation, and the cultures it seeks 
to grow, can be learned by following resilience as one significant 
consequence of the twentieth- century ecosystem project.
Nicole Shukin (2016, 3) recently put it succinctly: “Resilience is 
exploited as a resource of flexible labor and life accustomed to 
the chronically precarious conditions of unlimited growth.” This 
chapter began by outlining the promise of Pasquinelli’s recommen-
dation for a renewed study of Guattari’s “machinic ecology” seeking 
to repair labor’s abstraction into information and energy expedited 
by the twentieth century’s technoscientific projects. As outlined 
here, this process is highly visible in charting the history and 
operationality of the concept of the ecosystem: from theory of the 
mind through to resilience policies. By locating the discourse of the 
ecosystem within longer philosophical conversations surrounding 
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the proximity of the ecosystem to theories of organicism is better 
understood for its full political implications: “the perception of the 
whole earth as ecosystem (as in the Gaia hypothesis)” (Pasquinelli 
2017, 320) requires a critique of political economy.
Not unlike the “recursive irony” defining the technonatural hybrid-
ity of the ecosystem, to use Bryant’s (2006) phrase, Pasquinelli 
(2017) implies it is more than a coincidence that the outcome of 
the industrial division of energy and information as an abstraction 
of labor is climate change driven by accelerated capitalism, as 
global warming is made visible by the same epistemological tools 
that power the problem. Such is the recursive trap of planetary 
computation:
With almost identical techniques, global data centers 
accumulate information and intelligence, not just about 
the world’s climate but also about financial markets, 
logistical chains, international terrorism, and, more im-
portantly, social networks of billions of individuals. Is the 
similarity of climate science and control apparatuses just 
a coincidence, or does it point to a more general form of 
governance? The vast network of climate science appears 
like an extended cybernetic loop with big institutions 
taking the role of the nervous system of a pretty large 
organism— planet earth. (320)
Pasquinelli’s provocation here regarding large- scale forms of 
environmental governance is important and, as highlighted earlier, 
in line with a longer set of historical transactions that can be traced 
through to questions placing the organic individual in relation to 
the social and technological whole. Indeed, as the history of the 
ecosystem shows, this form of governance is already identifiable in 
policy as resilience.
Yet, there is still the problem of the ecosystem as fashioned by 
economy and ecology. As prophetic as Guattari’s text appears while 
regarding his admittedly uncanny forecasting of Donald Trump’s 
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“the civilizations of Silicon and Carbon, the lineages of Information 
and Energy” as the “carbosilicon machine,” requires additional 
commentary, especially as he maintains that “it may be better to 
try and consolidate the assemblage of energy and information 
into new systemic notions.” I find his position toward new systems 
intriguing, given the emphasis on “autonomy” as articulated across 
both of his arguments reviewed here: normative social auton-
omy as “self- governing and able to invent new laws, rules, and 
habits. . . . To rethink social autonomy today one has to see what 
the autonomy of energy and the autonomy of information mean 
together in an expanded (and technified) notion of labor” (323). 
This proposition is certainly in line with Guattari’s programmatic 
for collective management and control of the three ecologies, as 
steered away from profit and productivity. However, I draw this 
point out in caution because, given the danger of holism, I believe 
renewed focus on the assumed progressiveness of the system 
needs qualification.
Resilience proves a particularly thorny concept. As Cooper and 
Walker (2012, 157) demonstrate, referencing the influence of 
complex systems theory on social science, it is the complex social 
system itself that “thrives upon disruptions to its own state of 
equilibrium. . . . By metabolizing critique into its internal dynamic, 
the complex adaptive system remains self- referential even when 
it encounters the most violent of shocks.” The risk, here, is that 
adaptive complex systems are defiant to critique insofar as 
commentators who employ “the system they set out to challenge” 
ultimately find their challenge self- referential and systemically 
enclosed, effectively cannibalized. The target of criticism “reabsor-
b[s] critique into the workings of systems theory itself” (Cooper and 
Walker 2012, 157). This is best illustrated by the easy movement of 
Holling’s resilient ecosystem from a position of ecological critique 
to paradigmatic complicity with neoliberal finance, neoconservative 
militarization, and environmental governance. Cooper and Walker 
stress that to confront a system that “transform[s] perturbation 
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self- differentiation” (157), what is required are “completely different 
terms” and “a movement of thought that is truly counter- systemic” 
(157). Guattari’s ecological theory— its celebrated utility, inspi-
ration, and prescience— needs to be carefully considered in this 
cautionary regard, given The Three Ecologies’s reluctant embrace of 
cybernetic systems and the immanent critique they afford. Then, at 
the limit of the problem of resilience is the imperative for flights of 
thought beyond the system.
As Pasquinelli (2017, 321) reminds us, the “incestuous relation 
between planetary control and planetary disequilibrium” is a 
complication located in the abstraction between “civilizations of 
Silicon and Carbon.” His emphasis on historically repairing the sep-
aration of energy and information as they bear on contemporary 
political formations is crucial, and the forms of struggle the implied 
historical cleavage might call for remain a site for future study. 
As I have illustrated here, the ecosystem is one such chimeric 
concept that provides a platform with which to describe and test 
the appositeness of existing socioecological theories. Insofar as it 
provides a common ground upon which economy and ecology do 
play, the ecosystem concept remains a productive term of media 
in its conceptual relay of energy and information; ecology and 
economy; and its description of the recursive epistemological lens 
of the system that nests environment, technology, and mind.
To close, Cooper (2008, 20) argues while regarding the “bioecono-
my” that the “capitalist delirium” driving the repeated reinvention 
of the limits to growth follows from Freud: “the psychotic delirium, 
as opposed to the neurotic fantasy, is crucially concerned with the 
breakdown and recreation of whole worlds. Delirium is systemic, 
not representative. It seeks to refashion the world rather than 
interpret it.” Then, as with Tansley’s grafting of psychoanalysis, the 
ecosystem is perhaps best viewed as one such delirious mecha-
nism recursively derived from an underlining systemic logic: eco-
system as a cognitive machine raising and destroying worlds with 
the privileged machination of shuffling and sorting the reticulation 
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economic growth and the promise of renewable life. It is equally 
important to recall that Tansley formed the ecosystem with specific 
reference to its environmental negativity— a constitutional absence 
that the concept itself is driven toward. Exploring this forgotten 
exterior to the ecosystem might prove rewarding as we chart steps 
outside the ecology of mind.
Notes
 1 I would like to express my gratitude to Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Derek Woods, 
and Florian Sprenger for their invaluable feedback and vital commentary in 
responding to drafts of this chapter.
 2 Donna Haraway highlighted the “ecosystem” as a primary example of the 
hybrid cybernetic organism, or cyborg, figuration in both “A Cyborg Manifesto” 
(Haraway 1991) and Modest_Witness: “the cyborg live[s] without innocence in 
the regime of technobiopower, where literacy is about the joining of infor-
matics, biologics, and economics— about the kinship of the . . . ecosystem” 
(Haraway 1997, 2).
 3 For more on the Cold War militarized context driving the Odums’ conceptual 
development of the cybernetic ecosystem, see Laura Martin’s (2018) “Prov-
ing Grounds: Ecological Fieldwork in the Pacific and the Materialization of 
Ecosystems.”
 4 Besides Anker’s account, see Sagan (1991), Luke (1995), Bryant (2006), and 
Steyerl (2017). See also Sagan and Margulis’s (1989) publication Biospheres: 
From Earth to Space, where they make the case for extraterrestrial technoeco-
logical biospheres as self- regulating colonies.
 5 I am grateful to Lukas Rieppel for pointing me toward Bannon’s work on Bio-
sphere 2 and how this ideology contradicts the “no lifeboats” argument.
 6 Hito Steyerl has initiated a conversation about Bannon’s administration of Bio-
sphere II as “a great metaphor for technofascism” (Steyerl and Vidokle 2017).
 7 Henning Schmidgen (2005) also sees this distinction as made by Canguilhem in 
1952. Schmidgen locates the careful distinction between the mode of existence 
of organic and technical objects as an early critical response to American cyber-
netics, and it is worth pointing out that this position on the potential “organol-
ogy” (Hörl 2015, 4) of institutions and technology deeply influenced another of 
Canguilhem’s students, Gilbert Simondon, who made a sustained point about 
the distinct evolutionary patterns of organic and technical individuals.
 8 For more on this analogy, see also Karen Greenberg’s (2014) perspective.
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